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One of the core principles of contract law is the requirement of definite- 
ness. Conventional wisdom holds, however, that the indefiniteness doctrine 
is largely ignored by courts. In this Article, Professor Scott examines the con- 
temporary case law on indefinite contracts and his review yields three striking 
findings. First, there is a surprisingly high volume of litigation. Second, the 
indefiniteness doctrine lives on in the common law of contracts. Third, a 
large number of the indefiniteness cases involve contracts that are "deliber- 
ately" incomplete-that is, parties have declined to condition performance on 
available, verifiable measures that could be specified in the contract at rela- 
tively low cost. These findings raise a fundamental question: Why do par- 
ties write deliberately incomplete agreements in the shadow of a robust indefi- 
niteness doctrine? One answer is that these agreements may be self-enforcing. 
But most of the recently litigated cases involve contracts that do not appear to 
be self-enforcing in the traditional sense. A second answer is indicated by 
recent work in experimental economics, which suggests that roughly half the 
population behave as if reciprocity were an important motivation, while the 
other half react as if motivated entirely by self-interest. This evidence of a 
taste for "reciprocal fairness" in nearly half the population, argues Professor 
Scott, may expand the domain of self-enforcing contracts beyond what is con- 
ventionally understood. It may also support a theory that predicts that delib- 
erately incomplete contracts that rely on self-enforcement through reciprocal 
fairness between strangers are more efficient than the alternative of more com- 
plete, legally enforceable agreements. 
INTRODUCTION 
All contracts are incomplete. There are infinite states of the world 
and the capacities of contracting parties to condition their future per- 
formance on each possible state are finite.' But incomplete contracts dif- 
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1. Both transaction costs, broadly defined, and information asymmetries are 
formidable barriers to writing complete contingent contracts. For discussion, see Robert 
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fer along key dimensions. Many contracts are incomplete because parties 
decline to condition performance on uncertain future states that they 
cannot observe or verify to courts.2 In these cases, incompleteness is ex- 
ogenous to the contract; that is, the parties are incapable of contracting 
efficiently over measures of performance that cannot be verified.3 Other 
agreements, however, appear to be "deliberately" incomplete, in the 
sense that parties decline to condition performance on available, verifia- 
ble measures that could be specified in the contract at relatively low cost. 
Thus, incompleteness is endogenous to these agreements, suggesting that 
the parties had other reasons for leaving the terms in question 
unspecified.4 
E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 847, 862-64 
(2000). 
2. The distinction between observable and verifiable information is analytically 
important in information economics, but both concepts remain somewhat imprecise. 
According to standard economic theory, a datum of information is "unobservable" if the 
other contracting party cannot perceive it. Buyers, for example, ordinarily cannot observe 
a seller's production cost. A datum of information is "observable but not verifiable" if the 
other party can perceive it, but cannot prove the fact to a court or other third party at an 
acceptable cost. For example, an employer usually can know which employees sometimes 
shirk, but it would be expensive relative to the gains to prove to a court that a particular 
employee shirked 20% of the time. A datum of information thus is "verifiable" if a party 
both can observe it and prove its existence to a third party. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. 
Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L.J. (forthcoming Dec. 
2003). Legal scholars understand, of course, that what can and cannot be proved to a 
court is often a function of factors other than the cost of producing evidence. See infra 
note 57. 
3. Under modern law, open term or relational contracts (where incompleteness is a 
function of factors exogenous to the contract) are routinely enforced by courts. There is a 
rich literature analyzing the optimal contractual response to uncertainty and 
environmental complexity in these ongoing relationships. A number of scholars have 
argued that parties write such contracts when uncertainty makes it costly to negotiate fixed- 
performance terms or because open term contracts respond better to problems of moral 
hazard. See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 
997, 1007-09 (1992) (moral hazard concerns and alignment of individual and joint 
contract risks support use of open contract terms); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, 
Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089, 1092 (1981) (complexity and 
uncertainty of future events motivate use of open contract terms); Victor P. Goldberg, 
Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 527, 531-33 (discussing utility 
of open contract terms in preserving joint profits); Victor P. Goldberg & John R. Erickson, 
Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke, 
30 J.L. & Econ. 369, 370 (1987) (open contract terms reflect party comprehension 
problems and information generation costs); Paul L. Joskow, Asset Specificity and the 
Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence, 4J.L. Econ. & Org. 95, 101 (1988) 
(explaining incomplete contracts in terms of asset specificity and uncertainty). All of these 
various explanations turn, at bottom, on the fact that the relevant measures of 
performance are too costly to specify or are not verifiable. In this Article, I put this 
category of contract aside and focus on agreements where the parties have declined to 
condition performance on verifiable measures that were available at low cost. 
4. Among the reasons for leaving verifiable terms unspecified are high transaction 
costs, inadvertence, or, as I suggest in this paper, an intent to use self-enforcing 
mechanisms such as reciprocity. For discussion see George G. Triantis, The Efficiency of 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Thu, 21 Jan 2016 19:20:53 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2003] INDEFINITE AGREEMENTS 1643 
These deliberately incomplete agreements are unenforceable under 
traditional contracts doctrine. One of the core principles of contract law 
is the requirement of definiteness. An agreement will not be enforced as 
a contract if it is uncertain and indefinite in its material terms.5 A con- 
tract, that is, must be sufficiently complete such that a court is able to 
determine the fact of breach and provide an appropriate remedy. Only 
then does the doctrine direct courts to enforce the agreement by filling 
contractual gaps where necessary.6 Otherwise, the doctrine directs courts 
to deny enforcement and leave the losses to lie where they fall.' It is 
widely believed, however, that the indefiniteness doctrine is largely ig- 
nored by contemporary courts. Conventional wisdom holds that courts 
should (and do) strive whenever possible to fill contractual gaps with gen- 
eral standards of reasonableness and good faith.8 
But the conventional wisdom is misleading. A study of the contem- 
porary case law on indefinite contracts, which I undertake here, reveals 
some striking facts. First, there is a surprisingly high volume of litigation. 
Second, despite the perceived influence of the Uniform Commercial 
Code and despite widespread academic support for more judicial gap- 
Vague Contract Terms: A Response to the Schwartz-Scott Theory of U.C.C. Article 2, 62 
La. L. Rev. 1065, 1071-72 (2002). The argument advanced in this Article-that courts can 
(and do) make judgments about how aggressively to fill contractual gaps based on the 
reasons why the agreement is incomplete-is similar in some respects to the argument 
advanced by Eggleston, Posner, and Zeckhauser that courts should interpret simple 
contracts either strictly or liberally based on the reasons for contractual simplicity. See 
Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner & Richard Zeckhauser, The Design and Interpretation of 
Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 91, 126-32 (2000). 
5. See, e.g., Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 417 N.E.2d 541, 543 
(N.Y. 1981); Varney v. Ditmars, 111 N.E. 822, 824 (N.Y. 1916); Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts ? 33 (1981); Restatement of Contracts ? 32 (1932); 1 Samuel Williston, A 
Treatise on the Law of Contracts ?? 37-49 (Walter H. E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1957). 
6. E.g., U.C.C. ? 2-204(3) (2002); Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra note 5, 
? 33(2). For a discussion of the differences between the common law and Uniform 
Commercial Code approaches to uncertainty, see infra notes 21-36 and accompanying 
text. 
7. This general proposition is qualified to the extent that the agreement has been 
partially executed by the promisee. In that case, general principles of restitution may 
support a recovery on the basis of quantum meruit. See Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, supra note 5, ? 34(3) cmt. d. Moreover, a few courts have granted relief on the 
basis of promissory estoppel where the facts show a specific inducement by the promisor. 
See, e.g., Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 97 (Tex. 1965). 
8. See, e.g., 1 Arthur Corbin, Corbin on Contracts ? 95, at 400 (1963) ("[T]he court 
should not frustrate [the parties'] intentions if it is possible to reach a fair and just result, 
even though this requires a choice among conflicting meanings and the filling of some 
gaps that the parties have left."); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra note 5, 
? 33 cmt. a; cases cited infra note 36. In essence, the disagreement between the common 
law and contemporary approaches concerns which presumption should govern in cases of 
incompleteness. Everyone agrees that the evidence must support a finding that the 
promisor intended to be bound. The disagreement concerns just how proactive a court 
should be in supplying terms the absence of which would preclude giving a remedy. See 
infra text accompanying notes 30-33. 
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filling, the indefiniteness doctrine lives on in the common law of con- 
tracts. In literally dozens of cases, American courts dismiss claims for 
breach of contract on the grounds of indefiniteness, often without grant- 
ing any relief to the disappointed promisee.9 
This evidence raises a fundamental question: Why do parties write 
deliberately incomplete agreements in the shadow of a robust indefinite- 
ness doctrine? One answer is that parties may simply be ignorant of the 
distinction between unenforceable incomplete agreements and enforcea- 
ble open term contracts. Another answer is that these agreements may be 
self-enforcing. If the parties themselves can create efficient extralegal 
mechanisms for coping with problems of hidden action and hidden infor- 
mation, then they will be indifferent to legal enforcement. Scholars have 
long understood that reputation and the discipline of repeated interac- 
tions are efficient means of self-enforcement."' But these conditions for 
self-enforcement are stringent. Reputations work best in markets for ho- 
mogeneous goods or in ethnically homogeneous communities,11 and par- 
ties in ongoing relationships face end-game dilemmas.12 Indeed, most of 
the recently litigated cases do not appear to be self-enforcing in the tradi- 
tional sense. Rather, most are isolated transactions in heterogeneous 
markets between strangers trading at arm's length.i 
Recent work in experimental economics suggests, however, that the 
domain of self-enforcing contracts may be considerably larger than has 
been conventionally understood. A robust result of these experiments is 
that a significant fraction of individuals behave as if reciprocity were an 
important motivation (even in isolated interactions with strangers), while 
a comparable fraction react as if motivated entirely by self-interest. The 
evidence that in any population roughly half behave fairly and half be- 
have selfishly provides the foundation for a theory of fairness grounded 
in the human motivation to reciprocate.14 Reciprocity requires no en- 
forcement costs and also permits parties to contract over nonverifiable 
measures of performance. Thus, this theory predicts that self-enforce- 
ment of deliberately incomplete agreements between strangers is more 
9. See cases collected infra table 2. The frequency of dismissals on the grounds of 
indefiniteness is inconsistent with conventional assumptions, but the failure to grant relief 
in the face of claims of reliance is even more striking. See infra note 48. 
10. See Benjamin Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of 
Contractual Relationships, 34 Econ. Inquiry 444, 449-50 (1996); Robert E. Scott, Conflict 
and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 2005, 2039-49 (1987) 
[hereinafter Scott, Conflict and Cooperation]. 
11. See Janet Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogenous Middleman Group: An 
Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10J. Legal Stud. 349, 359-61 (1981) (suggesting 
that ethnic characteristics are low cost screening devices). 
12. For discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 16-18. 
13. See infra note 88. 
14. These experiments do not show that individuals have an intrinsic motivation to be 
fair. Rather they show that individuals engage in voluntary cooperation in contexts where 
pure self-interest would dictate noncooperative actions. The source of this behavior 
remains an open question. See infra text accompanying notes 104-112. 
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efficient than the alternative of more complete, legally enforceable 
contracts. 
A theory of reciprocal fairness also provides a fresh explanation for 
the prevalence of informal agreements to agree despite judicial decisions 
denying enforcement of such agreements. These "comfort agreements" 
can be understood as a means of screening potential trading partners by 
which the parties gain valuable information about each other's prefer- 
ences for reciprocity. In addition, the potency of reciprocal fairness as a 
method of self-enforcement explains (and justifies) the resilience of the 
common law indefiniteness doctrine in the face of a contemporary aca- 
demic consensus favoring the expansion of legal liability. The experi- 
mental evidence suggests that transforming an informal, indefinite agree- 
ment into a legally binding obligation is often counterproductive; legal 
liability can increase moral hazard and it may also "crowd out" the par- 
ties' self-enforcing mechanisms. 
In this Article I argue that the observed preference for reciprocal 
fairness offers the best available solution to the puzzle of deliberately in- 
complete agreements. Part I begins the analysis by evaluating the large 
and hitherto unexamined body of cases where courts decline to enforce 
agreements on the grounds of indefiniteness. In many of these cases the 
parties appear to discard verifiable information that they might have used 
to write more complete, legally enforceable contracts. Part II evaluates 
recent experimental evidence supporting a theory of reciprocal fairness, 
a theory that greatly expands the domain of self-enforcing agreements. 
Part III then turns to the central questions underlying the legal regula- 
tion of indefinite agreements: Why do parties write intentionally indefi- 
nite agreements? And can the courts' refusal to enforce these agree- 
ments be justified? 
I conclude that the robust experimental evidence of self-enforcing 
reciprocity undermines the conventional assumption that both fairness 
and efficiency are best served by expanding the domain of contractual 
liability. The error in the conventional analysis has been the instinct to 
generalize from those instances where self-enforcement has broken 
down. But the occasional failure of self-enforcement provides little gui- 
dance for how the law should treat the far greater number of instances 
where reciprocity may well be the more efficient mnechanism for making 
credible promises. Fairness theory better explains the behavior of con- 
tracting parties as well as the durability of the indefiniteness doctrine 
which, by narrowing the domain of legal liability, preserves space for par- 
ties to exploit opportunities to reciprocate. 
I. RETHINKING THE LAW OF INDEFINITE CONTRACTS 
The first objective of contract law is to resolve a basic sorting prob- 
lem. Our legal system does not enforce all promises, even those that were 
seriously intended. Thus, a normative theory of contract law must ex- 
plain why certain bargained-for promises deserve a presumption of en- 
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forceability in the first place. One response is that the freedom to ex- 
change entitlements presupposes the freedom to contract for such an 
exchange. Both freedoms are supported by norms of autonomy and effi- 
ciency. Parties who are denied either the freedom to contract or the free- 
dom to exchange entitlements suffer unnecessary constraints on their 
choices, constraints that undermine the value of the entitlements them- 
selves. Thus, the normative claim is that the law, by standing behind a 
present promise to exchange entitlements in the future, offers individuals 
more choices than they would otherwise enjoy and, other things being 
equal, more choice is better than less.'5 
But this argument assumes too much. It assumes, for example, that 
promises are not credible absent legal enforcement. Yet we know that 
contracts often are performed even in the absence of any legal sanctions 
for breach. Contracts may be "self-enforcing" in two senses.'6 First, 
where parties contemplate repeated interactions, neither party will 
breach an agreement if the expected gains from breaching are less than 
the expected returns from future transactions that breach would sacri- 
fice. Second, neither party will breach if the reputational costs of a bro- 
ken promise are greater than the gains from breaching. Both of these 
familiar mechanisms for self-enforcement suffer from significant con- 
straints, however. Ongoing relationships inevitably come to an end and 
thus all repeated interactions are subject to a familiar end-game problem. 
Indeed, in the limiting case, the anticipation of the last transaction may 
cause the entire cooperative pattern to unravel."7 Reputation, in turn, 
will only work to make promissory commitments credible if other con- 
tracting parties can conveniently learn about the reasons why any particu- 
lar transaction broke down. Consequently, a reputation for trustworthi- 
ness is difficult to establish, especially in heterogeneous economies where 
most market participants are unfamiliar with any particular contracting 
party.'8 Thus, it is generally assumed that many (if not most) contracts 
fall outside the self-enforcing range. 
15. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L.J. 
1909, 1913 (1992). 
16. There is an extensive literature on self-enforcing contracts. See, e.g., Benjamin 
Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 
89J. Pol. Econ. 615, 617 (1981); L.G. Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53J. 
Bus. 27 (1980); Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Contract, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 177, 201-02 
(1985). 
17. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation, supra note 10, at 2033. 
18. Reputations are most effective as a means of self-enforcement in small, 
homogeneous communities, where contracting behavior soon becomes common 
knowledge, and sanctions against untrustworthy parties can effectively be imposed. See 
Avner Greif, Informal Contract Enforcement: Lessons from Medieval Trade, in 2 The New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 287, 287-95 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) 
[hereinafter New Palgrave Dictionary] (detailing effect of cultural and social factors on 
self-enforcement); Landa, supra note 11, at 356 (explaining that members in kinship/ 
ethnic groups have strong incentive to remain loyal to each other). Sanctions for bad 
behavior are also effective where industries establish trade associations that can both 
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To qualify the earlier argument, therefore, legal rules matter where 
reputation and repeat dealings do not or cannot restrain the incentive to 
breach. In such an environment, legal enforcement is necessary to make 
a promise to perform credible.'" The decision to enforce a contract 
raises a set of subsidiary questions: What is the proper domain of free- 
dom of contract? Within that domain, what is the proper role of the state 
in interpreting the meaning of incomplete contracts?20 Much recent 
scholarship has focused on one or the other of these subsidiary questions, 
but too little attention has been directed to the initial sorting question 
and to understanding the line between informal, self-enforcing agree- 
ments and legally enforceable contracts. In this Article I begin the work 
of developing a theory of contract enforcement by examining the domain 
of self-enforcement and its relationship to legal enforcement. 
A. Indefinite Agreements at Common Law 
One of the core principles of the common law of contracts is that the 
promises of parties to a legally enforceable contract must be certain and 
definite such that their intention may be ascertained with a reasonable 
degree of certainty. This principle was illustrated in the celebrated case 
of Varney v. Ditmars, where the New York Court of Appeals declined to 
enforce an agreement by an architect to give his draftsman "a fair share 
of [the] profits" in exchange for a greater effort on some pressing 
projects.21 The court held that such an agreement was not only uncer- 
tain, but "is necessarily affected by so many other facts that are in them- 
identify bad behavior and impose appropriate sanctions, such as boycotts. The contracting 
behavior of the members of the association thus becomes part of the group's collective 
memory. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's 
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765, 1771-77 (1996) 
(explaining National Grain and Feed Association's procedures for facilitating trade 
between members); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: 
Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724, 
1745-54 (2001) (detailing importance of reputation and nonlegal sanctions in cotton 
industry). 
19. There are at least two paradigmatic cases where legal enforcement of promises is 
necessary in order to maximize social welfare: 1) in volatile markets where a party's failure 
to perform could threaten its partner's survival; and 2) where the contractual surplus 
would be maximized if one or both of the parties made relation-specific investments. In 
either case, absent legal enforcement, promises to perform would not be credible and 
parties would predictably decline to write the efficient contract. See Schwartz & Scott, 
supra note 2. 
20. The freedom of contract question focuses on the set of mandatory rules that limits 
the enforcement of certain contracts on either substantive policy grounds or because of 
defects in the bargaining process. Enforcement of contracts within that domain then 
requires both a theory of interpretation that maps from the semantic content of the 
parties' writing to the writing's legal implications as well as a set of efficient default rules 
for those cases where contracting costs may have prevented the parties from solving their 
contracting problems themselves. For discussion, see Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of 
Article 2, 62 La. L. Rev. 1009, 1016-22 (2002). 
21. 111 N.E. 822, 823 (N.Y. 1916). 
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selves indefinite and uncertain that the intention of the parties is pure 
conjecture .... Such an executory contract must rest for performance upon the 
honor and good faith of the parties making it."22 
An earlier New York case, Mackintosh v. Thompson,23 further illus- 
trates the kind of agreement that was found unenforceable under the 
common law rule. In Mackintosh, the plaintiff sued to recover compensa- 
tion in addition to a stated salary which had already been paid. He 
claimed that while he was employed by the defendants, he informed 
them that he intended to quit unless he was given an increase in salary. 
In response, one of the defendants told him that they would make it 
worth his while if he would stay on, promising to give him a share of the 
profits on certain buildings that they were then constructing. When the 
plaintiff asked what would be the amount of the bonus, he was told, "You 
can rely on me. I will see that it is all right."24 The court held that the 
arrangement was too indefinite to form the basis of any obligation on the 
part of the defendant.25 
This common law rule not only applied to cases such as Varney and 
Mackintosh where the contract terms themselves were vague, but also ex- 
tended to agreements where essential terms were explicitly left to further 
negotiation. For example, in Petze v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., a New 
York appellate court held that an agreement providing that "the method 
of accounting to determine the net distributable profits is to be agreed 
upon later" was unenforceable under the indefiniteness rule.26 Courts 
thereafter consistently held that such "agreements to agree" were unen- 
forceable so long as any essential term was open to negotiation.27 
Even at common law, however, the indefiniteness doctrine was sub- 
ject to several qualifications. First, indefiniteness would not prevent a re- 
covery in quantum meruit in the event one party to an informal agree- 
ment performed in reasonable reliance on its terms, even though they 
were vague, indefinite, and uncertain.28 Second, the question of whether 
the promise of a "fair" share of the profits or a "reasonable" compensa- 
tion was too indefinite depended on the subject matter of the agreement. 
In sales of goods, for example, common law courts held that the words 
"fair and reasonable value" were a synonym for "market value" and thus a 
definite promise to pay the fair market value of goods was inferred from 
the express agreement of the parties.29 Indeed, the common law courts 
22. Id. at 824 (emphasis added). 
23. 68 N.Y.S. 492 (App. Div. 1901). 
24. Id. at 494. 
25. Id. 
26. 109 N.Y.S. 328, 329 (App. Div. 1908). 
27. See Robert E. Scott &Jody S. Kraus, Contract Law and Theory 34-44, 322-25 (3d 
ed. 2002). 
28. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Shapiro, 77 A.2d 598, 601 (Me. 1951) ("It is not necessary 
that [plaintiff] lose the fair value of his services by reason of an illusory contract for a 
bonus."); E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts ? 3.30 (3d ed. 1999). 
29. Varney v. Ditmars, 111 N.E. 822, 824 (N.Y. 1916). 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Thu, 21 Jan 2016 19:20:53 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2003] INDEFINITE AGREEMENTS 1649 
went farther in the case of sales contracts, holding that even where a fixed 
price or other consideration was not specified in the agreement, it was 
presumed that a reasonable price was intended. Common law courts 
showed no reluctance, therefore, in filling such gaps in sales contracts on 
the view that "[s]uch contracts are common, and when there is nothing 
therein to limit or prevent an implication as to the price they are, so far as 
the terms of the contract are concerned, binding obligations."'s 
The rationale of the common law indefiniteness doctrine, then, was 
grounded in the presumed intentions of the parties. But where the par- 
ties did not make their intentions clear, the common law rule presumed 
that the failure to reach agreement on material terms, where no terms 
could be objectively supplied, implied an intention not to be legally 
bound. Thus, under the common law rule the question of intent was 
addressed indirectly, by looking at the extent to which material terms 
were left unspecified by the parties. If the court found that the terms 
were sufficiently complete and definite, it would infer from that fact the 
intent to contract; if not, the court would infer that the parties did not 
intend to be bound. 
B. The Modern View on Indefiniteness and Open Terms 
The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code followed the line of 
cases holding that price terms in sales contracts could be supplied from 
evidence of market prices. Thus, U.C.C. ? 2-305 provides that parties can 
conclude a sales contract even though the price is not specified or they 
agree to agree on a price and are subsequently unable to agree.31 But the 
Code goes beyond the common law in explicitly authorizing an expansive 
role for courts in filling open terms in otherwise incomplete agree- 
ments.32 As I noted above, the justification for the common law rule was 
that it honored the intent of the parties. That is also the justification for 
U.C.C. ? 2-204: It honors the parties' intent to be bound. The differ- 
ence, then, is not the purpose of the rule but the presumption that fol- 
lows from agreements with open or indefinite terms. The U.C.C. shifts 
from the bright-line rule of the common law to a broad standard. Under 
30. Id. 
31. U.C.C. ? 2-305 (2002) states: 
The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for sale even though the 
price is not settled. In such a case the price is a reasonable price . . . if (a) 
nothing is said as to price; or (b) the price is left to be agreed by the parties and 
they fail to agree.... 
32. U.C.C. ? 2-204 provides that "[e]ven though one or more terms are left open a 
contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a 
contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy." The 
Official Comment to this provision provides that "the fact that one or more terms are left 
to be agreed upon [is not] enough of itself to defeat an otherwise adequate agreement. 
Rather commercial standards .. . are intended to be applied, this Act making provision 
elsewhere for missing terms needed for performance, open price, remedies and the like." 
? 2-204 cmt. 
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the U.C.C. standard, a court is asked to focus on the underlying question 
of intent directly, and is encouraged to infer that intent despite the exis- 
tence of open or indefinite terms. That, of course, is just what many 
courts have done.3 
The standard-based approach of the U.C.C., now followed as well by 
the Restatement,34 is justified primarily by the defects of the common law 
bright-line rule. In many contracting contexts a rule that determines in- 
tent by focusing on missing terms is seriously overinclusive. All contracts 
are incomplete; therefore, the fact of incompleteness does not by itself 
imply an intention to avoid legal enforcement. Incompleteness may be 
caused by many factors, including the desire for flexibility and the unwill- 
ingness of parties to condition future performance on nonobservable or 
nonverifiable measures of performance. Thus, an intention to be bound 
to terms reasonably supplied by courts may often be the best inference to 
be drawn from relational contracts that are incomplete owing to such 
exogenous factors.35 
But, at least implicitly, the modern approach goes even farther, shift- 
ing the presumption toward enforcement whenever terms are left open 
or are indefinite. Professor Corbin perhaps best expressed this view: 
In considering expressions of agreement, the court must 
not hold the parties to some impossible, or ideal, or unusual 
standard. It must take language as it is and people as they are. 
All agreements have some degree of indefiniteness and some 
degree of uncertainty. 
If the parties have concluded a transaction in which it ap- 
pears that they intend to make a contract, the court should not 
frustrate their intention if it is possible to reach a fair and just 
result, even though this requires a choice among conflicting 
meanings and the filling of some gaps that the parties have left. 
The fact that the parties have left some matters to be deter- 
mined in the future should not prevent enforcement, if some 
method of determination independent of a party's mere "wish, 
will, and desire" exists, either by virtue of the agreement itself or 
by commercial practice or other usage or custom.36 
33. See Scott & Kraus, supra note 27, at 315-22. 
34. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra note 5, ? 33. 
35. See supra note 3. To be sure, an intention to be legally bound is not the only 
inference to be drawn from exogenous incompleteness. Another possibility is that the 
parties intend to renegotiate ex post once the uncertainty is removed. 
36. 1 Corbin, supra note 8, ? 95, at 396, 400-01; see also Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, supra note 5, ? 33 cmt. a ("[T]he actions of the parties may show conclusively 
that they have intended to conclude a binding agreement, even though one or more terms 
are missing or are left to be agreed upon. In such cases courts endeavor, if possible, to 
attach a sufficiently definite meaning to the bargain."). Justice Cardozo put the 
contemporary presumption in favor of enforcement this way: "Indefiniteness must reach 
the point where construction becomes futile." Heyman Cohen & Sons v. M. Lurie Woolen 
Co., 133 N.E. 370, 371 (N.Y. 1921); see also Denver D. Darling, Inc. v. Controlled Env'ts 
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The contemporary presumption toward filling gaps in incomplete 
contracts has led commentators to assume that the common law indefi- 
niteness doctrine is no longer a serious impediment to legal enforce- 
ment.37 But, surprisingly, the nearly universal acceptance of the judicial 
practice of supplying open terms for relational contracts has not slowed 
the pace of litigation over indefinite agreements. Moreover, even when 
these agreements are assessed under the contemporary standard, many 
fail to pass muster. In recent years, courts have invoked the indefinite- 
ness doctrine to refuse enforcement of promises to pay "costs and ex- 
penses for sumptuous living and maintenance,"3" to forgo collection "as 
long as [debtor] make[s] progress toward profitability,"'9 to "provide fu- 
ture financing,"40 to send a seller "some work,"41 and to provide "loan 
supervision information."42 
In sum, the law of indefiniteness is not a story of a traditional com- 
mon law rule for limiting legal liability being inexorably overturned by a 
contemporary preference for filling gaps with broad standards of good 
faith, reasonableness, and the like. Evidence that courts continue to sort 
agreements that lack material terms on the basis of the indefiniteness 
doctrine may reflect a further example of the tension between common 
law formalism and Code contextualism, a tension that is clearly evident, 
for example, in widely disparate theories of contractual interpretation.43 
But if the disparate results in indefiniteness cases reflect more than sim- 
ply this tension, it is important to identify the factors that determine 
Constr., Inc., 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213, 223-24 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing Corbin); Bethlehem 
Steel Corp. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 468 A.2d 748, 766-67 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (describing 
intent of U.C.C. to preserve contracts and fill in gaps), aff'd, 488 A.2d 581 (Pa. 1985); 
Novelly Oil Co. v. Mathy Constr. Co., 433 N.W.2d 628, 629 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (describing 
"liberality" of indefiniteness principle). 
37. For example, John Calamari and Joseph Perillo have described contemporary 
judicial practice as follows: 
[U]nder the traditional rule where the parties have purported to agree on a 
material term and left it indefinite, the agreement is too vague and indefinite. If, 
however, the parties are merely silent as to material term [sic] or discuss the term 
but do not purport to agree on it and do not condition their agreement on an 
agreement as to this term, there is a strong possibility that a term may be implied 
from surrounding circumstances or supplied by a court using a gap-filler. 
John D. Calamari &Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts 51-55 (4th ed. 1998); see also 
Gergen, supra note 3, at 1062 (providing arguments against "the now (happily) discredited 
doctrine that courts ought not enforce indefinite contracts"). 
38. Trimmer v. Van Bomel, 434 N.Y.S.2d 82, 86 (Sup. Ct. 1980). 
39. Champaign Nat'l Bank v. Landers Seed Co., 519 N.E.2d 957, 960 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1988). 
40. Union State Bank v. Woell, 434 N.W.2d 712, 717 (N.D. 1989). 
41. Roy v. Danis, 553 A.2d 663, 664 (Me. 1989). 
42. Univ. Nat'l Bank v. Ernst & Whinney, 773 S.W.2d 707, 710 (Tex. App. 1989). 
43. See, for example, the current split between courts that apply a "hard" parol 
evidence rule and a strong plain meaning rule and courts following the "soft" parol 
evidence and contextual meaning rules of the U.C.C. Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence 
Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 533, 534 (1998). 
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when a contract is likely to be held unenforceable owing to indefinite- 
ness, and how these agreements differ from those where courts routinely 
fill gaps with open terms. These questions cannot be answered so long as 
the patterns of contemporary indefiniteness litigation are examined casu- 
ally and unsystematically. In the following discussion, therefore, I report 
the results of a systematic examination of the indefiniteness case law and 
undertake a functional analysis of how courts do, in fact, sort between 
enforceable and unenforceable agreements. 
C. What Do Courts Actually Do? 
In order to create a database for evaluating the enforcement deci- 
sions of contemporary American courts, I began with a sample of all liti- 
gated cases between 1998 and 2002. A search for contracts cases of the 
past five years that invoke certainty as to subject matter returned 238 deci- 
sions.44 A detailed examination of 137 cases randomly selected from the 
base pool revealed forty-eight cases where the issue of indefiniteness was 
only peripherally relevant to the outcome.45 In many of these cases, the 
issue was raised in the context of preliminary negotiations where the de- 
fendant claimed that the representation relied on by the plaintiff was in- 
sufficiently definite to be characterized as an offer or an acceptance. In 
these instances, therefore, the underlying question was whether the par- 
ties had reached an agreement at all, rather than the further question: 
Assuming the parties have concluded an agreement, is that agreement 
legally enforceable as a contract?46 
The remaining eighty-nine cases directly raise the issue of enforce- 
ment.47 In thirty-four cases the court enforced the contract despite the 
defendant's claim that the agreement was indefinite. In the remaining 
44. I searched Westlaw's 95k9(1) database-Contracts: Requisites and Validity: 
Nature and Essentials in General: Certainty as to Subject-Matter: In General-restricting 
it to all state and federal cases in the last five years. I conducted the search in January 
2003. 
45. The random selection process proceeded in two stages. I first selected one of 
every four cases in the base pool for a sample of sixty cases. Subsequently, I expanded the 
sample by selecting every other case from the remaining 178 cases, yielding a total sample 
of 149 cases. I then discarded twelve cases where indefiniteness or certainty was not 
discussed in the body of the opinion, leaving a sample of 137 cases. 
46. The issue of precontractual liability raises interesting but quite different questions 
from those discussed in this paper. For this reason, I leave aside the issues of 
precontractual reliance and the related question of when, if ever, liability should attach 
prior to the conclusion of an agreement (albeit an indefinite one). For the best doctrinal 
analysis of this question, see E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary 
Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 217 (1987). For 
recent law and economic analyses, see Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient 
Reliance, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 481 (1996); Jason Scott Johnston, Communication and 
Courtship: Cheap Talk Economics and the Law of Contract Formation, 85 Va. L. Rev. 385 
(1999); Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel 
in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 Yale L.J. 1249 (1996). 
47. The cases are coded and tabulated infra tables 1 & 2. 
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fifty-five cases the court denied enforcement, despite finding that the par- 
ties had concluded an agreement, on the grounds that the agreement was 
too indefinite and uncertain and thus was legally unenforceable as a con- 
tract.48 One hypothesis that might explain the different results is that 
those courts enforcing allegedly indefinite agreements are following the 
trend of the U.C.C. and the Second Restatement, while the larger number of 
courts that deny enforcement are adhering to the traditional common 
law view.49 This hypothesis implies 1) that the cases granting enforce- 
ment would include a larger number of Code cases, and 2) that non- 
Code cases would divide between states following the traditional view and 
those adopting the modern approach to open terms. 
Neither of these empirical conditions is confirmed by the data. First, 
only one of the cases granting enforcement involved the sale of goods 
under the U.C.C.5 Indeed, in only three instances did a court cite with 
48. It is equally noteworthy that, of the fifty-five cases denying enforcement on the 
grounds of uncertainty, only two authorized restitutionary relief for the plaintiff. See 
Bergman v. DeIulio, 826 So. 2d 500, 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that plaintiff 
had viable quantum meruit claim against defendant but could not recover damages on his 
claim); Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co. v. Uneco Realty Co., 765 N.E.2d 420, 425-26 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (holding that plaintiff had viable quantum meruit claim). The 
conventional view is that a promisee can recover in restitution for partial performance of 
an indefinite agreement. Thus, for example, courts have permitted an employee to 
recover in quantum meruit for the value of extra efforts induced by his employer's promise 
to share the resulting profits. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Shapiro, 77 A.2d 598, 602 (Me. 1951); 
Farnsworth, supra note 28, ? 3.30 ("[I]f an employer's promise to pay an employee a share 
of the profits in addition to a wage is unenforceable for indefiniteness, the employee may 
have restitution of the reasonable value of any services performed in excess of the wages 
paid."). But where both the promise to perform additional work as well as the promise to 
provide a "bonus" are indefinite, the cases from the sample deny relief altogether. See, 
e.g., Chirichillo v. Prasser, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1140 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (holding there was 
no evidence parties even struck a bargain as plaintiff "asked for nothing" and defendant 
"offered nothing in return"); Burns v. Dees, 557 S.E.2d 32, 38 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) 
(concluding that agreement is invalid because defendant did not promise to provide 
plaintiff with definite share of profits in return for plaintiff providing certain services); 
Mooney v. Mooney, 538 S.E,2d 864, 867 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (holding contract 
unenforceable because parties never discussed particulars of defendant's promise to help 
care for grandchild); Smith v. Hammons, 63 S.W.3d 320, 325-26 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) 
(sustaining summary judgment in favor of defendant where parties did not agree on 
essential terms of contract, such as plaintiff's share of profits, and plaintiffs promise to 
perform additional work was absent altogether); Cheloha v. Cheloha, 582 N.W.2d 291, 
297-98 (Neb. 1998) (holding purported contract unenforceable because indefinite as to 
material terms); see also cases cited infra table 2. 
49. See Nellie Eunsoo Choi, Note, Contracts with Open or Missing Terms Under the 
Uniform Commercial Code and the Common Law: A Proposal for Unification, 103 
Colum. L. Rev. 50, 52-53 (2003) (framing divergent results in cases as jurisdictional divide 
in which "[s]omejurisdictions apply the traditional common-law doctrine and hold service 
contracts with open or missing terms invalid for indefiniteness, while others apply the 
modern U.C.C. approach to hold the contracts valid" (footnote omitted)). 
50. See Am. Laminates, Inc. v.J.S. Latta Co., 980 S.W.2d 12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Thu, 21 Jan 2016 19:20:53 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1654 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:1641 
approval the Code approach to open terms,"5 and the Second Restatement 
view was the basis for decision in just four others.52 Moreover, the divi- 
sion between enforcement and nonenforcement is not correlated with 
whether or not the state has a traditional or modern approach to contrac- 
tual liability. In two states, California and Pennsylvania, the courts ac- 
knowledged a presumption favoring enforcement and filling gaps when- 
ever possible.5 But notwithstanding the presumption, courts in those 
states divided on the question of whether the agreement at issue was en- 
forceable.54 In the remaining thirty-one jurisdictions, the courts at least 
formally applied the traditional indefiniteness doctrine, yet the cases di- 
vided roughly two to one between nonenforcement and enforcement. In 
eight states-Connecticut, Maryland, New York, Illinois, Ohio, Georgia, 
Tennessee, and Texas-appellate courts reached different enforcement 
decisions on different facts."55 Taken as a whole, therefore, the data tend 
to refute the conventional academic wisdom that the legal standard by 
itself influences the enforcement choice.56 
Rather, the cases drawn from the sample show that courts generally 
focus on whether the parties have fully exploited verifiable information in 
concluding their agreements.57 Where the contract is incomplete owing 
51. See ATACS Corp. v. Trans World Communications, Inc., 155 F.3d 659, 666-67 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (citing U.C.C. ? 2-311(1) (2002)); Willow Funding Co. v. Grencom Assocs., 779 
A.2d 174, 182 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) (citing Connecticut codification of U.C.C. ? 2-204); 
Am. Laminates, Inc., 980 S.W.2d at 22-23 (citing Missouri codification of U.C.C. ? 2- 
204(3)). One possible explanation for the absence of Code cases in the sample is that the 
Code rule on open terms, especially price terms, is sufficiently clear and well established 
that parties decline to litigate "settled" law. 
52. See Gonzalez v. Don King Prods., Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 313, 315 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 
(citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra note 5, ? 204); Gallagher, Langlas & 
Gallagher v. Burco, 587 N.W.2d 615, 617 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (citing Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, supra note 5, ? 33); Kostelnik v. Helper, 770 N.E.2d 58, 63 (Ohio 
2002) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra note 5, ? 34(2)); Davidson v. 
Holtzman, 47 S.W.3d 445, 454 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, supra note 5, ? 33). 
53. ATACS Corp., 155 F.3d at 666-67; Krantz v. BT Visual Images, L.L.C., 107 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 209, 217-18 (Ct. App. 2001). 
54. Compare ATACS Corp., 155 F.3d at 668, and Denver D. Darling, Inc. v. Controlled 
Env'ts Constr., Inc., 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213, 224 (Ct. App. 2001), with Aircraft Guar. Corp. v. 
Strato-Lift, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 830, 836-37 (E.D. Pa. 2000), and Halvorsen v. Aramark 
Unif. Servs., Inc., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 383, 386 (Ct. App. 1998). 
55. New York is perhaps the most influential state in the sample. Thirteen 
indefiniteness cases came out of New York courts. Enforcement was denied in ten 
instances and granted in three. 
56. Cf. Choi, supra note 49, at 52-53. 
57. In coding the nature of the information available to the parties to these 
agreements, I use a richer conception of verifiability than is common to formal contract 
theory. I define a measure of performance as verifiable if competent legal counsel is 
prepared to opine, ex ante, that the failure of the other party to perform can be 
demonstrated to a court with a substantial probability of success. Relevant to this 
prediction is not only the cost of producing evidence but also the relationship between the 
legal standard of proof and the management of evidence, and the relative complexity and 
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to uncertain future states that are not observable or not verifiable, the 
courts will typically enforce the contract by filling the resulting gaps. In 
that sense, the disputed performance cannot be contracted for and the 
incompleteness is thus exogenous to the contract. But if the parties ap- 
pear to have discarded verifiable information that they might have used 
at relatively low cost to condition performance, the courts decline to en- 
force the agreement. Here the failure to use available measures of per- 
formance suggests either that the parties' action was the result of inadver- 
tence or that the agreement was deliberately indefinite. 
1. Legally Enforceable Incompleteness. - In thirty-four of the sample 
cases, the courts enforced contracts notwithstanding the claim of indefi- 
niteness."58 The enforceable agreements ranged across a variety of con- 
texts from business development and marketing"59 to investment con- 
tracts,6? and from distributorship agreements61 to joint ventures.62 In 
each of these contexts, the parties faced the canonical "contracting prob- 
lem" of ensuring both efficient ex ante investment and efficient ex post 
trade in the subject matter of the contract.63 In each case, however, the 
parties negotiated over complex transactions and were forced to cope 
with problems of hidden action and hidden information. Thus, high 
transaction costs as well as problems of asymmetric information64 would 
interdependence of the measures of performance in the contract. This definition of 
verifiability raises a further complication that I sidestep in this paper. This paper, and most 
economic theory, treat verifiability as an exogenous variable. But, in fact, whether a 
measure of performance is verifiable or not is subject to some party control. Thus, the 
motivation for a particular contract term may be the ability of the moving party to 
manipulate the proof necessary to establish the fact in question. See, e.g., Franklin Allen & 
Douglas Gale, Measurement Distortion and Missing Contingencies in Optimal Contracts, 2 
Econ. Theory 1, 5 (1992) (discussing assumed ability of supplier to distort contingent 
measurement system, while pointing out potential costs to that supplier of doing so). For a 
discussion of the relationship between optimal contract design and the strategic 
management of evidence, see Chris Sanchirico & George Triantis, Evidence Arbitrage: 
The Fabrication of Evidence and the Verifiability of Contract Performance (Univ. of Va. 
Sch. of Law, Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 02-17, Dec. 2002), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf abstract_id=353243 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
58. See infra table 1. 
59. Quadron Software Int'l Corp. v. Plotseneder, 568 S.E.2d 178, 180-81 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2002). 
60. Giannaris v. Cheng, 219 F. Supp. 2d 687, 690-91 (D. Md. 2002). 
61. Krantz v. BT Visual Images, L.L.C., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 209, 218 (Ct. App. 2001). 
62. DeBoer Structures (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Shaffer Tent & Awning Co., 233 F. Supp. 2d 
934, 949 (S.D. Ohio 2002). 
63. Contracting parties invest efficiently when they take actions that maximize the 
expected surplus from their contract. Contractors trade efficiently when, and only when, 
the value of the exchanged performance to the buyer is greater than the cost of 
performance to the seller. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2. 
64. Asymmetric information results from private facts that either cannot be observed 
by the other party or cannot be verified to a third party. See Alan Schwartz, Incomplete 
Contracts, in 2 New Palgrave Dictionary, supra note 18, at 277, 280-82 (1998) (describing 
problems of contracting under conditions of asymmetric information); see also lan Ayres 
& Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal 
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likely have prevented the parties to these contracts from writing com- 
plete, first-best efficient contracts. When these conditions prevent parties 
from creating a term, the resulting contract is incomplete but may never- 
theless be second-best efficient. 
To understand the reasoning that underlies this conclusion, con- 
sider a salient example, Krantz v. BT Visual Images, L.L.C.65 In Krantz, 
plaintiff and defendant were in the business of marketing telecommuni- 
cations systems. Plaintiff alleged the following facts: He and defendant 
entered into a "reseller agreement" by which defendant appointed plain- 
tiff its distributor for San Francisco and Marin County with the right to 
sell its video conferencing equipment and other products. Thereafter, 
plaintiff and defendant signed a "teaming agreement" in which they 
agreed to submit a joint bid for Kaiser Permanente's video conferencing 
business both within and outside the Bay Area. To enhance the chances 
of getting the contract with Kaiser, plaintiff agreed to reduce his commis- 
sion on the sale of defendant's products.66 In exchange, the parties 
agreed that, if their joint bid was successful, plaintiff would receive an 
increased profit margin on future business from Kaiser and the parties 
would share jointly in all subsequent business with Kaiser.67 Defendant 
ignored the teaming agreement and submitted its bid to Kaiser indepen- 
dently. Plaintiff sued for breach of contract and sought an accounting 
and recovery of lost profits. The trial court granted defendant's motion 
for summary judgment on the grounds of indefiniteness. The California 
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, while one "might agree the un- 
stated future margins and price terms are indefinite, they were necessarily so: 
it remained to be seen whether the joint proposal would be accepted."6" 
The court in Krantz identified the key variable that triggers ajudicial 
decision to enforce: The parties wrote as complete an agreement as they 
could under the circumstances.69 The information that they discarded 
involved the relationship between the plaintiffs efforts in servicing Kaiser 
under the contract and the defendant's investment in customized compo- 
nents suitable for Kaiser. The interaction between these inputs was com- 
plex. Both of these interactive inputs were essential ingredients to the 
Rules, 101 Yale L.J. 729 (1992) (same). For formal analyses of the effects of asymmetric 
information on incomplete contracting, see B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 
Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity, 88 Am. Econ. Rev. 902 (1998); Benjamin E. 
Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, Judicial Modification of Contracts Between Sophisticated 
Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach, 9 J.L. Econ. & 
Org. 230, 245-48 (1993); Jonathan Thomas & Tim Worrall, Income Fluctuation and 
Asymmetric Information: An Example of a Repeated Principal-Agent Problem, 51 J. Econ. 
Theory 367, 367-70 (1990). 
65. 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 209. 
66. Id. at 211-13. 
67. Specifically, the parties agreed to negotiate precise profit margins and product 
pricing once the bid was accepted. Id. at 218. 
68. Id. (emphasis added). 
69. Id. 
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price of the product to Kaiser and to the resulting profits available for 
division. Thus, the complexity of the relationship would have increased 
the transaction costs of specifying profit margins more concretely. More- 
over, neither the plaintiffs marketing efforts nor the quality of the defen- 
dant's specialized investment could be verified to a court. Selecting a 
contract term that conditions performance on unverifiable information 
would have been a poor choice because it would have created moral haz- 
ard. When a party cannot observe or verify the value of a relevant eco- 
nomic parameter, such as effort or quality, that party will reject a contract 
that conditions on that parameter because of the risk that the other party 
will behave strategically.70 Where the incompleteness is predominantly a 
function of environmental complexity or of informational asymmetries, 
the data show that courts regard the resulting contract as "obligationally 
complete" and thus legally enforceable."7 
2. Unenforceable Indefinite Agreements. - By contrast with Krantz, in 
fifty-five of the sample cases appellate courts refused to enforce the par- 
ties' agreement on the grounds of indefiniteness.72 In a handful of cases, 
the indefiniteness seemed clearly to be the product of inadvertence or 
carelessness on the part of the parties (or their lawyers) in writing the 
contract."7 But the bulk of the cases where courts denied enforcement to 
indefinite agreements cannot be understood in terms of careless omis- 
sions or an inadvertent failure to negotiate over conditions of perform- 
ance that were otherwise verifiable. Rather, the facts support the hypoth- 
esis that the parties intentionally and deliberately concluded agreements 
that were indefinite as to key terms and that later resulted in litigation. 
Moreover, unlike the cases of exogenous incompleteness, in these in- 
stances the parties failed to incorporate in their agreements readily availa- 
ble, verifiable measures of performance. In sum, the parties to these 
agreements appear to have preferred the indefinite agreement they con- 
cluded to the more explicit and verifiable alternative that they ignored. 
70. Parties will write a more complete contract covering a specialized investment 
(such as the efforts of the plaintiff or the output of the defendant) when (i) they can 
specify clearly what standards the investment is to meet; (ii) the investment will meet those 
standards if undertaken correctly; and (iii) a party can prove to a court that the product of 
the investment did or did not satisfy the contractual standards. Schwartz & Scott, supra 
note 2. Krantz shows that these conditions are sometimes hard to meet. Contracts that 
compensate a seller on the basis of the quality of the end-product or an agent on the basis 
of the value of her efforts can create efficient incentives only when quality or effort is 
verifiable. Id. 
71. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 64, at 731. 
72. See infra table 2. 
73. See Don Webster Co. v. Indian W. Express, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 959 (S.D. Ind. 
2001); Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Car & Truck Leasing Sys., Inc., 574 S.E.2d 914 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2002); Bulloch S., Inc. v. Gosai, 550 S.E.2d 750 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Strauss Paper Co. 
v. RSA Executive Search, Inc., 688 N.Y.S.2d 641 (App. Div. 1999); Kostelnik v. Helper, 770 
N.E.2d 58 (Ohio 2002). 
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Although there are some variations in the cases, two common factual 
patterns predominate. The first, illustrated by Smith v. Hammons,74 is the 
"indefinite bonus contract."'"75 Smith entered into an agreement with 
Hammons Entertainment to produce and perform in a magic show. The 
parties agreed that Smith would be paid a stipulated yearly salary of 
$150,000 in return for using his creative efforts to "[d]esign, stage, direct, 
perform and star in [a] magic and music show."'76 In addition, the agree- 
ment specified that if Smith faithfully performed his obligations, Ham- 
mons would subsequently pay Smith a signing bonus as well as a share of 
the profits from the show. Subsequently, Hammons became disap- 
pointed with Smith's efforts and fired him. Smith sued for his share of 
the bonus and lost profits. The court affirmed a summary judgment for 
Hammons, holding the bonus agreement too indefinite and thus 
unenforceable.7 
The second archetype is a variation on the same theme. Here, the 
parties enter into what is traditionally designated an "agreement to 
agree" and what we might term a "comfort agreement."'78 As an example, 
in Hunt v. Coker the parties entered into a written agreement expressing 
their joint desire for Coker to sell, and Hunt to buy, Coker's insurance 
agency.79 The document provided for a purchase date and set out several 
options for the purchase price, including 45% of the commissions that 
renew over five years, or 40% of the commissions that renew over six 
years, or 35% that renew over seven years.80 The agreement provided 
that Hunt would consolidate his location with Coker as soon as possible, 
with each party paying his own expenses until the sale date. Subse- 
quently, Coker became unhappy with Hunt's work and informed him 
that the offer of sale would not be honored. Hunt sued for breach.81 
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court dismissing the 
74. 63 S.W.3d 320 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002). 
75. Eighteen cases in the sample are coded as "indefinite bonus contracts." See infra 
table 2. 
76. Hammons, 63 S.W.3d at 322. 
77. Id. at 326. 
78. The informal agreements to agree that I have designated "comfort agreements" 
are a subset of the larger category of agreements to agree that include, among others, 
formal letters of intent. The analogy is to "comfort letters" that are typically issued by a 
parent company to a lending institution and are aimed at encouraging the lender to issue 
credit to a subsidiary. The letter seeks to assure the lender without the parent committing 
itself as a surety or a guarantor. For further discussion, see Larry A. DiMatteo & Rend 
Sacasas, Credit and Value Comfort Instruments: Crossing the Line from Assurance to 
Legally Significant Reliance and Toward a Theory of Enforceability, 47 Baylor L. Rev. 357 
(1995); Rena Sacasas & Don Wiesner, Comfort Letters: The Legal and Business 
Implications, 104 Banking L.J. 313 (1987). Eleven of the sample cases are coded as 
"comfort agreements," while four others involved more formal letters of intent. See infra 
table 2. 
79. 741 So. 2d 1011, 1013 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
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suit on the grounds of indefiniteness. The purchase "options" were not 
true options, the court held, since the parties never agreed that Hunt 
should have the right to choose among the designated alternatives and 
thus the parties never agreed on a stipulated price. Rather, the court 
found the agreement akin to an agreement to agree and thus 
unenforceable.82 
In the cases falling within each of these prototypes, the courts appear 
most influenced by the failure of the parties to agree on readily available, 
verifiable terms. A stipulated bonus for achieving specific performance 
standards could easily have been negotiated in Hammons.g" For example, 
the parties could have conditioned a fixed bonus on predetermined "de- 
liverables" (or benchmarks) that are themselves verifiable and serve as 
proxies for the level of efforts requested by the promisor.84 Alternatively, 
the parties could have specified an advance against a percentage of the 
profits from the magic show as is common in many franchising and li- 
censing contexts."85 Similarly, in Hunt the parties could have chosen a 
single method of determining the purchase price of the agency, or they 
could have granted to one of the parties a real option to select among the 
alternative pricing formulae. In both cases, therefore, the parties' failure 
to make the agreement sufficiently definite, and thus legally binding, 
seems to have been intentional and deliberate. In other words, the indef- 
initeness was endogenous to the contract, and the courts appear to infer 
from that fact that the parties either do not intend or do not deserve legal 
enforcement. 
82. Id. at 1015. 
83. In addition, see Larson v. Johnson, 184 F. Supp. 2d 26, 29-38 (D. Me. 2002): In 
1995, Johnson asked Larson to supervise a construction project on his property in Maine. 
Larson was paid a monthly rate of $6,700 based on the total estimated cost of the project, 
plus lodging, divided into monthly payments. After completing the project, Johnson was 
so pleased with the quality of the work and Larson's effort that he gave Larson a $175,000 
bonus for doing the job. Thereafter, Johnson permitted Larson to live on his property 
rent free in exchange for basic caretaking duties. Subsequently, in 1999, Johnson asked 
Larson to supervise a further project to construct a workshop on the property. Larson 
asked for the same rate ($6,700 per month) as per the priorjob. Johnson responded that 
he would "take care" of Larson if he would do the project and told him to "trust the Great 
Oracle" (meaning Johnson). Larson worked on the shop project in addition to his other 
duties for over nine months, but when he asked repeatedly to be paid at the same rate as 
the earlier job, Johnson fired him. The court held that the claim to a "bonus" was too 
indefinite but that Larson's claim for wages at his earlier rate presented a jury question. 
In Larson, just as in Hammons, the parties failed to exploit any number of commonly 
used terms to create an enforceable incentive contract. For example, a specific bonus 
could have been pegged to desirable effects of Larson's efforts-e.g., finishing the job on 
time or bringing the project in under budget. Or, the parties could have used a third 
party, such as an architect, as the arbiter of quality. 
84. The stipulation for prescribed "deliverables" is common in many transactional 
settings, such as contracts between architects and their clients. 
85. See, e.g., Victor P. Goldberg, The Net Profits Puzzle, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 524, 525 
(1997) (describing ubiquitous use of royalty offsets against fixed advances in 
entertainment industry). 
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These cases of deliberately incomplete agreements present a genu- 
ine puzzle. The sample data show that courts are uniform in declining to 
enforce these agreements. And yet relatively sophisticated parties in busi- 
ness transactions continue to negotiate such agreements in the shadow of 
judicial nonenforcement. This behavior appears directly inconsistent 
with the assumptions of contract theory that parties will not contract over 
nonverifiable terms but will contract over verifiable terms that can be 
specified at low cost. 
How can we understand these cases? Let us begin by noting some 
common features: The agreements are simple rather than complex, and 
the commitments made by each promisor are clear. Thus, the interac- 
tion is relatively free from the moral ambiguity that attends complex in- 
teractions.86 In this respect, these cases are quite unlike those described 
above where the courts enforce the incomplete contract. A plausible hy- 
pothesis, therefore, is that these contracts are self-enforcing; either the 
parties are relying on reputational sanctions or on the overhang of re- 
peated interactions to make their promises credible. Indeed, the similar 
practice of firms issuing legally unenforceable "comfort letters" to pro- 
spective lenders has been explained as a reputational signal that makes 
the agreements self-enforcing.87 
But the cases in the sample do not square easily with the common 
understanding of the domain of self-enforcing agreements. The transac- 
tions represented by the cases are, for the most part, isolated, one-shot 
interactions between relative strangers in heterogeneous markets where 
reputational constraints are thought to be quite weak."8 In such an envi- 
ronment, reputation alone is an inadequate means of credibly enforcing 
promises. Even if others can observe the interaction, they are unlikely to 
learn about the true reasons why the particular transaction broke down. 
Without moral clarity, the mere fact of breakdown is not sufficient to im- 
pose a reputational cost on either party. If self-enforcement is to be a 
satisfactory explanation for this puzzle, therefore, its domain must be sig- 
86. The respective undertakings of each party and the failure to perform one or more 
of them are relatively obvious in simple, clear transactions. In that sense, the transaction 
has a moral clarity. By contrast, in complex transactions where the parties' performances 
are iterated, it is often difficult to determine which party has first failed to perform as 
promised. Given the highly interactive nature of the parties' responses to each other, it is 
difficult to know whether one party's failure to perform a particular task represents a 
breach of promise or is a measured, retaliatory response to an earlier failure of 
performance by the other. For discussion, see Scott, Conflict and Cooperation, supra note 
10, at 2051-53. 
87. See Sacasas & Wiesner, supra note 78, at 329 ("Legally vague promises and 
inferences from cautious language are not always valueless in business. . . . Custom shows 
that memorializing even a weak legal commitment carries some moral and business weight. 
The letter can be shown to others, and reputations can be injured by the writer's breach of 
faith."). 
88. In 67% (thirty-seven of fifty-five) of the cases where the courts declined 
enforcement, the transactions were essentially discrete, one-shot interactions between 
relative strangers. See infra table 2. 
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nificantly larger than is conventionally assumed. In the discussion that 
follows in Part II, I evaluate emerging economic theories of reciprocal 
fairness that purport to broaden the domain of self-enforcement to in- 
clude the transactions evidenced in the data. 
II. RECIPROCAL FAIRNESS AS A MEANS OF SELF-ENFORCEMENT 
Ideas about fairness are entrenched in legal doctrine, including con- 
tract doctrine. Equitable estoppel, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, 
the doctrine of avoidable consequences, unconscionability, good faith, 
reasonableness, and reformation are just a few of the contract doctrines 
that might be understood in fairness terms. Moreover, many people hold 
strong notions of fairness that reflect an apparent predisposition toward 
reciprocity and equality of treatment. But law and economics scholars 
have largely ignored the fairness debate. One reason is that the claims of 
law and economics rest on the predictive power of rational choice theory, 
a theory that assumes individuals choose between competing alternatives 
based on rational self-interest. 
In recent years, two sustained lines of attack have been mounted 
against rational choice theory. The first-behavioral decision theory- 
challenges the rationality assumption and has gained much attention 
among legal scholars."9 There is now substantial evidence that individu- 
als make systematic cognitive mistakes in laboratory experiments when 
asked to solve specified individual decision problems.90 But these experi- 
ments do not test a general theory of how people make decisions. Thus, 
they raise the question of external validity: Will parties in the real world 
behave as the experimental subjects did?9' Because the answer to this 
question is unclear, the legal implications of behavioral decision theory 
remain open to debate.92 
89. There is an extensive literature traveling under the label of "behavioral law and 
economics" that builds on research in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics. 
See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1998). For a survey of the literature, see Daniel C. 
Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: 
A Literature Review, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1499 (1998). 
90. The early seminal work in this field includes Richard H. Thaler, Quasi Rational 
Economics (1991); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of 
Decision Under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263 (1979); Richard Thaler, Some Empirical 
Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency, 8 Econ. Letters 201 (1981); Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman,Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Science 1124 (1974). 
91. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2; see Jessica L. Cohen & William T. Dickens, A 
Foundation for Behavioral Economics, Am. Econ. Rev.: AEA Papers and Proceedings, 
Special Edition May 2002, at 335, 335 (noting that "lack of theoretical foundations [means 
that] the policy influence of [behavioral economics] is limited by its inability to predict 
circumstances in which anomalous behavior will arise (other than in those sorts of 
circumstances in which it has been observed before) or how it will respond to policy 
changes"). 
92. For a comprehensive analysis of the psychological literature that questions the 
normative relevance of behavioral decision theory for legal policy, see Gregory Mitchell, 
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The second critique, which has received much less attention, accepts 
rationality as a first-order approximation of individual choice, but chal- 
lenges the claim that all individuals are exclusively motivated by their ma- 
terial self-interest. Recent work in experimental economics has provided 
robust evidence that many experimental subjects have strong preferences 
for fairness and reciprocity.93 This evidence implies that a substantial 
fraction of people are motivated by fairness concerns as well as by self- 
interest.94 If people differ in regard to how selfishly or fairmindedly they 
behave, this difference has important economic and legal consequences. 
In particular, the social preferences for reciprocity and equality of treat- 
ment are the strongest candidates for developing a theory that expands 
the range of self-enforcing contracts to include isolated interactions be- 
tween relative strangers. 
This Part describes the results of recent investigations showing that a 
significant fraction of experimental subjects behave as if fairness were an 
important motivation (even in isolated interactions) while the other frac- 
tion react as if motivated entirely by self-interest. The evidence that in 
any population roughly half are fair and half are self-interested provides 
Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral 
Analysis of Law, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1907 (2002); Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and 
Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics' 
Equal Incompetence, 91 Geo. L.J. 67 (2002). 
93. See generally Martin Dufwenberg & Georg Kirchsteiger, A Theory of Sequential 
Reciprocity, Games & Econ. Behav. (forthcoming 2004) (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review); Ernst Fehr et al., Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental 
Evidence, 65 Econometrica 833 (1997); Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of 
Fairness, Competition and Cooperation, 114 Q.J. Econ. 817 (1999) [hereinafter Fehr & 
Schmidt, Fairness, Competition and Cooperation]; David K Levine, Modeling Altruism 
and Spitefulness in Experiments, 1 Rev. Econ. Dynamics 593 (1998); Matthew Rabin, 
Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 Am. Econ. Rev. 1281 (1993); 
Armin Falk & Urs Fischbacher, A Theory of Reciprocity (Inst. for Empirical Research in 
Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 6, July 2000), available at http:// 
www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp006.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). For a review 
of the literature, see Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of Incentives, 46 
Eur. Econ. Rev. 687 (2002) [hereinafter Fehr & Falk, Psychological Foundations]. Despite 
the experimental results, rational choice theorists are reluctant to abandon the self-interest 
assumption. One reason is that this assumption has been quite successful in providing 
accurate predictions in some economic domains. For example, models based on self- 
interest make very good predictions about the behavior of parties in competitive markets. 
There is a further, methodological reason. Changing assumptions about preferences 
makes it much more difficult to generate testable hypotheses because phenomena can 
then be explained by assuming the "right" preferences. The experimental evidence 
suggests, however, that this convention may no longer make much sense. Ernst Fehr & 
Klaus Schmidt, Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity-Evidence and Economic 
Applications 2 (Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 
75, 2001), available at http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp075.pdf (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Fehr & Schmidt, Fairness and Reciprocity]. 
94. Fehr & Schmidt, Fairness and Reciprocity, supra note 93, at 2. The experimental 
findings are robust as to the experimental subjects, but the relevance of this data for the 
general population raises the separate question of external validity. See discussion infra 
Part II.D. 
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the foundation for two complementary theories of fairness that are 
grounded in the human motivation to reciprocate. In addition, I analyze 
the results of recent experiments testing these theories in the context of 
one-shot contractual interactions between perfect strangers. This experi- 
mental evidence suggests that incompletely specified contracts that leave 
space for reciprocation can achieve higher levels of efficiency than more 
explicit, legally enforceable contracts. These fairness values appear to in- 
teract with and complement the self-interest motivation of economic 
actors. 
A. The Empirical Evidence: The Heterogeneity of Fairness and Self-Interest 
The empirical challenge to the self-interest hypothesis began in the 
1980s when experimental economists started to study bilateral bargaining 
games in controlled laboratory settings. One of the games that produced 
the most dramatic evidence of social preferences other than self-interest 
was the Ultimatum Game."95 In the Ultimatum Game, a pair of subjects, 
separated from each other, must anonymously agree on the division of a 
fixed sum of money (say $100). Party A (the proposer) makes a single 
proposal of how to divide the amount. Party B (the responder) can ei- 
ther accept or reject the proposal. If B accepts, then each takes away her 
respective sum. If B rejects, then both get nothing. Under the standard 
assumptions of rational choice theory, there is a Nash equilibrium in 
which A proposes the smallest money unit available (say $1) and B ac- 
cepts. This result obtains because A knows that B is rational and self- 
interested and thus will always prefer something to nothing. Since B will 
accept even the smallest amount, A, who is also rational and self-inter- 
ested, will propose it in order to maximize her own payoff. 
The Ultimatum Game has been tested in various settings with rela- 
tively large sums of money (in some experiments the amount represents 
more than three months' income for the participants) and the result di- 
rectly contradicts the self-interest hypothesis.96 The evidence shows that 
any proposal less than 20% of the amount will be rejected with a 50% 
probability.97 Moreover, the probability of rejection decreases as the of- 
95. The seminal paper is Werner Giuth et al., An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum 
Bargaining, 3 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 367 (1982). In addition to the Ultimatum Game, 
other games were developed to test the self-interest hypothesis, including the Gift 
Exchange Game, the Trust Game, and the Dictator Game. All of these games have the 
salient feature of simplicity. Since the games are easy for experimental subjects to 
understand, the inferences to be drawn regarding their motivations are more robust than 
they would be were the games complex. 
96. Elizabeth Hoffman et al., On Expectations and Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum 
Games, 25 Int'lJ. Game Theory 289, 291-96 (1996); Ernst Fehr et al., Do High Stakes and 
Competition Undermine Fairness? Evidence from Russia 2-4 (Inst. for Empirical Research 
in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 120, July 2002), available at http:// 
www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp120.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter 
Fehr et al., High Stakes]. 
97. Fehr & Schmidt, Fairness and Reciprocity, supra note 93, at 5. 
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fer increases.98 Thus, it seems clear that many responders do not behave 
as the self-interest hypothesis predicts. They are prepared to reject offers 
they perceive as unfair even at a cost to themselves. A further robust 
result is that many proposers appear to anticipate that if they make a very 
low offer, there is a high probability that it will be rejected. This result 
has been confirmed by experiments in another simple game, the Dictator 
Game, in which the responder has no choice but to accept the proposer's 
offer. Results show that initial offers in the Ultimatum Game are substan- 
tially higher than in the Dictator Game, indicating that proposers apply 
backward induction and anticipate retaliation against unfair proposals.99 
The Ultimatum Game demonstrates that a substantial number of the 
experimental subjects are willing to punish unfair behavior even though 
the action is costly to them. Another game, the Gift Exchange Game, 
demonstrates that a large number of responders will voluntarily reward 
actions that they perceive as generous or fair.100 In the Gift Exchange 
Game, the proposer offers a sum of money between one and ten units 
(imagine that it is a salary offer). The responder can either accept or 
reject the offer. If she rejects, both subjects receive nothing. If the re- 
sponder accepts, she must then expend some amount of effort (think of 
it as job performance) that is costly to her. Standard rational choice the- 
ory predicts an equilibrium in which the responder will always choose the 
lowest possible effort level. (Why try any harder than you have to when 
effort is costly?) Anticipating this, the proposer will always propose the 
lowest possible salary offer. But again, the results directly contradict the 
self-interest hypothesis. All of the studies confirm that the average effort 
is positively correlated to the offered wage. This implies that responders, 
on average, will reward generous salary offers with generous efforts (even 
when it is costly for them to do so).101 
98. Colin F. Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners, J. 
Econ. Persp., Spring 1995, at 209, 211; Alvin E. Roth, Bargaining Experiments, in 
Handbook of Experimental Economics 253, 256-58 (Alvin E. Roth & John H. Kage eds., 
1995). 
99. Fehr & Schmidt, Fairness and Reciprocity, supra note 93, at 6; see also Alvin E. 
Roth et al., Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and 
Tokyo: An Experimental Study, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 1068, 1093-94 (1991). 
100. Ernst Fehr et al., Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental 
Investigation, 108 Q.J. Econ. 437, 450-53 (1993) [hereinafter Fehr et al., Market 
Clearing]; Fehr & Schmidt, Fairness and Reciprocity, supra note 93, at 6-7. 
101. Fehr & Schmidt, Fairness and Reciprocity, supra note 93, at 6-7; see Fehr et al., 
Market Clearing, supra note 100; cf. Gary Charness, Responsibility and Effort in an 
Experimental Labor Market, 42 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 375 (2000); Ernst Fehr & Armin 
Falk, Wage Rigidity in a Competitive Incomplete Contract Market, 107 J. Pol. Econ. 106 
(1999) (showing that employees' effort is positively correlated with wage level such that 
lowered wages prompt decreased employee effort); Ernst Fehr et al., Gift Exchange and 
Reciprocity in Competitive Experimental Markets, 42 Eur. Econ. Rev. 1 (1998) (showing 
that sellers' tendency to reciprocate generates positive relationship between prices offered 
by buyers and quality levels offered by sellers); Simon Gachter & Armin Falk, Reputation 
and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation, 104 Scandinavian J. Econ. 1 
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These experiments yield two important conclusions. First, the data 
show that the subjects in these experiments are heterogeneous: Some 
individuals cooperate voluntarily and some do not. In all of these games, 
the data are remarkably robust in showing considerable individual differ- 
ences among the subjects. Thus, for example, while a significant fraction 
of responders in the Gift Exchange Game repay generous offers with gen- 
erous efforts (the data across experiments are remarkably consistent that 
about 40% are "fair" types), a substantial fraction (again consistently 
ranging between 40 and 60%) also always make purely selfish effort 
choices.102 But despite the presence of heterogeneous responders (some 
fair, some selfish), the fraction of fair responders is sufficiently high to 
make a high salary offer profitable to the proposer. 
Second, it is important to emphasize that the interactions in all of 
these games are one-shot, isolated exchanges. The subjects do not know 
each other and only interact once, anonymously. Thus, the behaviors 
that are revealed in the experiments, especially the preference for reci- 
procity held by a fraction of the subjects, must be distinguished from pat- 
terns of cooperation that are revealed in iterated games. Patterns of co- 
operation and investment in ongoing relationships are perfectly 
consistent with self-interest. On the other hand, reciprocity in one-shot 
interactions directly contradicts the self-interest hypothesis.1"0 
B. Toward a Theory of Reciprocal Fairness 
Can the results of these experiments be explained by relaxing the 
assumption that all individuals are exclusively motivated by self-interest? 
There are several candidates for a theory of fairness that focus on the 
distributional effects of any interaction.'4 Thus, for example, one can hy- 
pothesize that some fraction of parties are motivated by altruism; that is, 
their utility increases with the well-being of other people. Altruism ex- 
plains the generous behavior of responders in gift exchange games, but it 
is clearly inconsistent with the evidence that some players retaliate and 
hurt other subjects even when it is costly for them to do so.105 An alterna- 
tive hypothesis is that some subjects are motivated by envy; that is, they 
care not only about their absolute wealth but also about their relative 
(2002) (showing that employees' increased effort in response to increased wages is greater 
over repeated transactions than in one-shot agreements). 
102. Fehr & Falk, Psychological Foundations, supra note 93, at 687, 691 n.4 
(reviewing experimental evidence). 
103. Id. at 690 & n.2. 
104. The utility functions of individuals with social preferences depend not only on 
their own material payoffs but also on how many material resources are allocated to others. 
Given these preferences, the actors are assumed to behave perfectly rationally and thus 
traditional game theoretic models can be used to predict equilibrium outcomes. Fehr & 
Schmidt, Fairness and Reciprocity, supra note 93, at 6-7. 
105. Id. at 13-14. 
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standing as compared to others.'16 This preference for envy is just the 
opposite of altruism. It means that a player suffers if she gets less than 
the other party but does not care about the other party if she gets more. 
Thus, while envy explains retaliation in ultimatum games and gift ex- 
change games, it does not explain the generous behavior in those 
interactions. 
Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt have developed a theory of inequity 
aversion that captures the key results in the experimental games and 
combines the features of both altruism and envy."'7 Under this theory, a 
person is altruistic to other players if her payoffs are above an equitable 
benchmark and is envious of others if their payoffs exceed that bench- 
mark. In other words, people compare themselves with others in their 
group (or with the other player in two-person games) by using a bench- 
mark of equality of distribution. Inequity aversion thus can explain both 
generous and punitive actions toward others.'08 
A second approach to the fairness problem focuses not on the distri- 
butional effects of an interaction but on the intent that can be inferred 
from those effects. This "intention-based reciprocity" assumes that a per- 
son cares about the intentions of the other party to a bilateral interaction. 
If the other party treats her kindly, then she wants to return the favor; but 
if the other party treats her unfairly, then she acts to punish unfair behav- 
ior. Thus, in this approach, the key is how a person interprets the actions 
of the other party.?'o Intuitively, it would seem that the intention to be 
fair plays an important role in many facets of life, independent of the 
distributive consequences themselves. And indeed, recent experiments 
provide clear support for the behavioral relevance of the intent of the 
actor.'10 These experiments show that, in assessing whether or not an 
action is fair, the subjects consider the intention that is signaled by the 
action as well as the distributive consequences of the action.' 11 Both fac- 
tors are germane. There is still evidence of reciprocity where subjects are 
106. See id. at 14 (noting that this "relative income" hypothesis has long lineage in 
economics and tracing it back to Thorstein Veblen). 
107. See Fehr & Schmidt, Fairness, Competition and Cooperation, supra note 93. 
108. Id. 
109. Rabin, supra note 93. These intention-based interactions cannot be modeled 
under traditional game theory but require a more complex and less tractable framework 
known as psychological game theory. See Fehr & Schmidt, Fairness and Reciprocity, supra 
note 93, at 18-20. 
110. E.g., Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Testing Theories of Fairness- 
Intentions Matter (Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper 
No. 63, Sept. 2000), available at http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp063.pdf (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review). To isolate the role of intent, Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher 
devised an experiment involving two sets of proposers. Proposers from one set were able 
to signal their intent to the responders by choosing from a range of offers from unfair to 
generous. Members of the other set of proposers could not signal intent because their 
"offers" were chosen randomly and the responders knew that the proposers were not 
responsible for the offer decision. Id. at 6-8. 
111. Id. at 16. 
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unable to signal intent, but the level of reciprocity is significantly en- 
hanced where the actor can infer the intention of the other player.l12 
Let us summarize, then, the key elements in formulating a theory of 
reciprocal fairness that is consistent with this substantial body of experi- 
mental evidence: First, many individuals behave reciprocally toward 
others in ways that deviate from purely self-interested behavior. In re- 
sponse to generous actions, many individuals are much more cooperative 
than rational choice theory would predict, and many individuals are 
more vengeful than their self-interest demands in responding to actions 
they perceive as unfriendly." Second, individuals repay gifts and exact 
punishment even in costly interactions with strangers in which the action 
will produce no material rewards.14 Finally, this is a heterogeneous 
world. Some individuals exhibit reciprocal fairness and others exhibit 
pure self-interest. Taking all the experiments together from such diverse 
countries as Austria, Indonesia, the Netherlands, Russia, and the United 
States, the fraction of reciprocally fair subjects ranges from 40 to 60% as 
does the fraction of subjects who are selfish."15 
C. Testing Reciprocal Fairness in Incomplete Contracts 
What, then, does a theory of reciprocal fairness tell us about the opti- 
mal design of contracts? To see the theory's relevance, consider the fol- 
lowing example: Assume that a buyer in New York is interested in acquir- 
ing a single shipment of the highest quality carved rosewood furniture- 
coffee tables, trunks, chests, etc.-from India. The buyer anticipates us- 
ing this shipment in a one-shot promotion of luxury home furnishings 
that she is planning to market for the holiday season. In a perfect world, 
the buyer would visit a market in New York, survey the imported rose- 
wood, and purchase the highest quality at the price prevailing for such 
goods. Unfortunately, no such market exists, so the buyer must contract 
to purchase the furniture from a seller in India. The buyer has never 
dealt with the seller before and she does not anticipate doing so again. 
There are two alternative contracts the buyer might propose. One 
option is to propose an obligationally complete contract (that is, a con- 
tract in which the parties condition performance on all verifiable infor- 
112. Id. at 2. 
113. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gichter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of 
Reciprocity, J. Econ. Persp., Summer 2000, at 159, 159 [hereinafter Fehr & Gfichter, 
Fairness and Retaliation]. 
114. Id. 
115. This heterogeneity is critical to understanding the apparent anomaly between 
bilateral interactions where evidence of reciprocal fairness is robust and experiments in 
competitive markets where almost all subjects behave as if they were self-interested. The 
economic environment determines the preference type that is decisive. Thus, in a 
competitive market a few selfish players can drive the price to the competitive level and no 
single fair person can affect that price. On the other hand, in bilateral interactions, the 
presence of a fraction of inequity-averse players can create incentives for selfish types to 
make fair offers. See Fehr & Schmidt, Fairness and Reciprocity, supra note 93, at 38-40. 
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mation and discard only nonverifiable information). Assume that high 
quality can be observed but not verified to a court, but that a court is able 
to verify that the goods do not meet merchantable quality-in other 
words, a court can determine that the delivered quality is unacceptable 
under that legal standard."16 This option thus requires the buyer to spec- 
ify the quantity of furniture required, set a quality level of ordinary 
merchantability, and propose to pay the market price commensurate with 
that quality (say $50,000). This contract is legally enforceable and, 
should the Indian seller deliver goods of less than merchantable quality, 
the buyer can recover expectation damages (although costs and attorneys 
fees would not be recouped),117 Moreover, since the seller will charge 
the market price for merchantable quality goods, much of the contrac- 
tual surplus (representing the value to the buyer of having goods of at 
least merchantable quality for its promotion) is retained by the buyer. 
There is a second option. The buyer can instead propose an inten- 
tionally indefinite contract. This agreement proposes a lower base price 
(say $40,000) for goods that are sold "As Is," subject only to a minimum 
contract description."8 In addition, the buyer promises to pay a bonus 
of as much as $20,000 if the seller delivers high quality goods satisfactory 
to the buyer. Here, in other words, the buyer is offering potentially to 
share a portion of the greater contractual surplus with the seller in return 
for the enhanced effort necessary to produce the specialized goods that 
maximize the buyer's value. But this proposal has a twist. The base price 
term in this incomplete contract would be enforceable (assuming the 
seller delivered goods meeting the contract description), but under the 
common law indefiniteness doctrine, neither any additional effort ex- 
pended by the seller nor the buyer's promise to give a bonus if satisfied is 
legally enforceable. Thus, there is a risk that the buyer will receive poor 
116. U.C.C. ? 2-314(2)(a) (2002) provides that goods must be "at least such as 
[would] pass without objection in the trade under the contract description." Thus, under 
this standard the court can determine if the attributes of the goods are consistent with the 
contract description and also are "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are 
used" under the general legal standard of merchantable quality. ? 2-314(2)(c). The 
assumption that merchantable goods are verifiable can be stated formally. Suppose that a 
seller could produce quality at varying levels. Denote the realized quality as q and the 
distribution of possible quality levels from which q is drawn as {q. .... qa.. . q}h), where qa 
is the average quality. Assume that any q < qa is verifiable, but the court cannot determine 
the quality level of anything that is above that verifiable standard. The parties could then 
write a contract that requires the seller to deliver the quality level qa at the market price pa. 
117. ?? 2-714(2), -715; Scott & Kraus, supra note 27, at 1109-22. 
118. Under an "As Is" contract, the seller makes no warranties of quality, see U.C.C. 
? 2-316(3) (a), but the seller is responsible for delivering goods meeting the basic contract 
description (e.g., "six rosewood tables, four carved trunks," etc.), see ? 2-313(1) (b) ("Any 
description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express 
warranty that the goods shall conform to the description."). Comment 4 to ? 2-313 
explains that a clause generally disclaiming all warranties of quality under ? 2-316 (such as 
an "As Is" disclaimer) cannot reduce the seller's obligation to supply goods sufficient to 
meet the contract description. 
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quality goods for which she must pay $40,000 (which is her lowest value 
contract). 
Which contract will maximize the expected contractual surplus? It is 
tempting to suggest that the obligationally complete contract, with a le- 
gally enforceable quality term, is on average more likely to maximize ex- 
pected joint returns. While the first-best contract would have the seller 
deliver high quality, high value goods and receive a total payment (in- 
cluding the bonus) of $60,000, the downside risk is that the seller will 
instead deliver low quality, low value goods and demand the $40,000 con- 
tract price. This risk exists because the indefinite agreement precludes a 
legal action against the seller should he deliver low quality goods that 
nevertheless meet the minimum contract specifications. Since high qual- 
ity is not verifiable, the first-best option is not contractable. The best 
available option, therefore, seems to be the legally enforceable contract 
for merchantable quality goods at a $50,000 price. 
This conclusion is strongly supported by rational choice theory. A 
game theorist would predict that under the indefinite bonus contract the 
Indian seller will deliver goods that meet the verifiable contract descrip- 
tion (in order to recover the $40,000 contract price) but will choose a low 
effort level, thus delivering lower quality goods. This is because expend- 
ing extra effort in producing higher quality goods is costly and the extra 
effort will not earn a compensating bonus payment. The bonus promise 
is discretionary and thus a self-interested buyer will always decline to pay 
any bonus regardless of the efforts expended by the seller. 
But do these predictions hold if preferences for fairness and reci- 
procity are taken into account? Under a fairness regime, the more com- 
plete, legally enforceable contract is likely to result in a relatively unequal 
distribution of the surplus. If the Indian seller is concerned about this, 
he could punish the buyer in two ways. First, as in an ultimatum game, he 
could simply reject the contract, in which case both parties would receive 
a zero payoff. Second, the seller could accept the contract offer but pun- 
ish the buyer's unfairness by shirking on the effort to produce merchant- 
able quality goods, thus necessitating costly litigation to enforce the 
agreement. On the other hand, the very same preferences for fairness 
and reciprocity that might lead a seller to retaliate against unfair behavior 
would actually enhance the performance of the more incomplete agree- 
ment. A fair buyer in this situation will reciprocate a high effort level 
from the seller by paying a generous bonus. Moreover, assuming that the 
fraction of fair types in the general population is consistent with the ex- 
perimental evidence, the probability of a fair bonus being paid is suffi- 
ciently great to motivate the seller (regardless of his type) to expend the 
extra effort. Thus, if a substantial fraction of the population responds to 
opportunities to reciprocate, we would predict that the indefinite bonus 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Thu, 21 Jan 2016 19:20:53 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1670 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:1641 
contract would actually produce a better result for both parties than the 
more complete, legally enforceable contract.119 
What do the experimental results show? Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt 
have designed an experiment involving a single interaction that tests the 
choice between an incomplete bonus contract that relies on reciprocity 
and a more complete incentive contract that monitors performance 
under the threat of costly legal enforcement.120 In the experiment, each 
principal was matched randomly and anonymously with a different agent. 
119. This result can be stated formally. Assume that 0 ? a ? 1 of the buyer population 
are fair types in the sense that these buyers will reciprocate a fair offer from the seller and 
comply with their promises even if the promises are legally unenforceable. Sellers know a, 
but do not know whether the particular buyer they face is fair or unfair. The buyer's 
valuation for the product v is v1 for the merchantable quality good and v, for the high 
quality good with associated prices pi and ph respectively. The indefinite contract should 
be written only when it would be socially efficient, which is when it would generate a 
greater surplus than the enforceable contract such that vh, - ph > v - p1. The seller's cost of 
producing high quality is c and the cost of producing low quality is normalized to zero. Let 
q, denote the high quality good and ql the low quality good. Recalling that quality is 
observable, the buyer offers the following contract: 
I. pi + (ph - p) = ph for qh 
II. pl for ql 
The bonus is ph- pl, which 
the fair buyer pays when the seller delivers high quality. Since 
quality is unverifiable, the unfair buyer will pay only pl regardless of what the seller delivers. 
Now consider the seller's problem when a buyer offers this contract. The seller will 
produce high quality when: 
ap, + (1 - a)p1 - c 2 pi 
The first term on the left hand side is the expected gain from a fair buyer (the probability a 
buyer is fair times the high quality price); the second term is the expected gain from a 
cheating buyer (the probability a buyer is a cheater times the low quality price); and the 
third term is the cost of high quality. The seller can produce low quality costlessly and get 




The left hand side is the expected marginal gain from producing high quality and the right 
hand side is the cost. Rearranging terms, the seller will produce high quality when: 
c Ct> 
ph- p1 
Holding constant the percentage of fair buyers, sellers are more likely to produce high 
quality when the cost of doing so is low-c is small-and when the premium that buyers 
will pay for high quality is large-the denominator is large. Holding the right hand side 
constant, sellers are more likely to produce high quality when the fraction of fair buyers is 
high-a is large. Assuming contracting costs are zero, all buyers will offer the contract 
described here. This is because the fair buyer is happy to pay for high quality and the 
unfair buyer is happy to cheat if he gets high quality. So ex ante the bonus contract is in 
every buyer's self interest; only fair buyers will comply, however. In addition, the seller is 
not trusting the buyer with whom she deals. Rather, she is making a profit-maximizing 
decision given her knowledge of the percentage of fair buyers and the other parameters. 
So sellers will sometimes produce high quality and sometimes not. 
120. Ernst Fehr et al., Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness 1-2 (Inst. 
for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 72, Feb. 2001), 
available at http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp072.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) [hereinafter Fehr et al., Incompleteness]. 
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The principal had to choose between an incomplete contract, where an 
initial wage offer was enforceable but both effort and bonus were discre- 
tionary, and a more complete contract with explicit incentives for effort 
and enforceable (and costly) sanctions for nonperformance.121 Ninety 
percent of the principals chose the bonus contract. Some principals did 
not pay a bonus, but a significant fraction did respond generously to 
higher levels of effort from the agents by paying an appropriate bonus. 
Thus, the average bonus increased significantly and proportionately with 
the level of effort provided. This made it worthwhile for agents (whether 
fair or selfish) to put forth much greater effort than the self-interest hy- 
pothesis would predict. Indeed, the average amount of effort induced by 
the bonus contract was two and a half times that which was induced by 
the explicit, legally enforceable contract.122 Thus, on average, the incom- 
plete bonus contract produced a much higher average payoff to both 
parties.123 
These experiments demonstrate that powerful incentives can be 
stimulated in a very incomplete contract between total strangers who may 
never interact again. Rather than using explicit sanctions, the incom- 
plete contract relies on reciprocal fairness as an enforcement device. Im- 
portantly, the incomplete contract does better precisely because it is in- 
121. In a typical session, twelve principals and twelve agents play for ten periods. In 
each period, an agent faces a different principal. A period consists of three stages. At 
stage one, the principal has to decide between the explicit or implicit contract. The 
implicit contract specifies a fixed wage and a desired effort level (between one and ten) 
that is costly to the agent. In addition, the principal can promise a bonus that may be paid 
after actual effort has been observed. There is no contractual obligation to pay the 
announced bonus, nor is the agent obliged to choose the desired effort level, but the 
principal is committed to paying the fixed wage. The explicit contract also specifies a 
binding fixed wage and a desired level of effort. Here, however, the principal can impose a 
fine that has to be paid to the principal in case of verifiable shirking. The verification cost 
is fixed. At stage two, the agent observes which contract has been offered and decides 
whether to accept or reject the offer. If the agent rejects the offer, the game ends and 
both parties receive a zero payoff. If the agent accepts, she then chooses the actual level of 
effort. At stage three, the principal observes the actual effort. If the principal has chosen 
the implicit contract, he then decides whether to award a bonus payment to the agent. If 
the principal offered the explicit contract and the agent's effort falls short of the agreed 
level, a random draw decides with a probability of one-third whether shirking is verifiable, 
in which case the agent has to pay the fine. If all players are purely self-interested there is a 
straightforward result. A selfish principal never pays a bonus. Anticipating this, the agent 
only provides the minimum effort of one. If the principal chooses the explicit contract, 
the principal should choose the maximum fine because this is the best deterrent against 
potential shirking. The parameters of the experiment are chosen such that a risk neutral 
and selfish agent maximizes expected utility by choosing an effort level of four if faced with 
the maximum fine. Since the enforceable effort level is only one under the implicit 
contract, the model predicts that principals prefer the explicit contract. Id. at 5-8. 
122. Id. at 21-23. 
123. The more complete, explicit contract produces a lower payoff, all else equal, 
because shirking is costly to monitor, verify, and sanction. The bonus contract stimulates 
greater efforts from agents because a principal's promise to pay a conditional bonus is 
credible and principals incur no enforcement costs. See id. at 20. 
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complete and thus leaves more freedom for the parties to reciprocate. By 
simply assuming the presence of a substantial fraction of reciprocally fair 
individuals, this anomalous result becomes predictable: The indefinite 
bonus contract will produce an outcome significantly closer to the first- 
best objective than will the more complete, legally enforceable contract. 
To be sure, this enforcement mechanism is not perfect and, depending 
on the fraction of reciprocal types in the population, it can fail. Yet the 
experimental evidence strongly suggests that the effect of reciprocal fair- 
ness, an effect that thus far has been neglected in contract theory, is an 
important element in optimal contract design. 
D. A Critique of Fairness Theory: Issues of External Validity 
Notwithstanding the predictive power of reciprocal fairness in exper- 
imental settings, the theory has yet to be tested seriously in real world 
contexts. Thus, any use of fairness theory still raises the question of exter- 
nal validity: To what extent do the experimental results predict how eco- 
nomic actors will behave in the real world? There are four major chal- 
lenges to the validity of this evidence in explaining real world contracting 
behavior and in formulating legal policy. 
1. Size of Stakes. - First is the question of whether the stakes in ex- 
perimental games are sufficiently high to simulate the response of real 
world actors in commercial contracts. It seems intuitively plausible, for 
example, that a preference for reciprocal fairness may become weaker 
when the monetary stakes are higher. Despite that intuition, however, 
experiments with relatively high stakes have shown patterns of reciprocity 
similar to the low-stakes experiments. Lisa Cameron tested the impact of 
high stakes on negative reciprocity (the willingness to punish unfair be- 
havior) with subjects in Indonesia. In a high stakes Ultimatum Game 
(representing over three months' income to the subjects), she found no 
variation in proposers' initial offers and only a slight increase in the ac- 
ceptance rate of low offers by responders.l24 
More recently, experiments in Russia in a Gift Exchange Game have 
tested the impact of high stakes on positive reciprocity (the willingness to 
reward fair behavior). In these experiments, the subjects earned on aver- 
age between two and three months' income. The study found that a ten- 
fold increase in the size of the stakes had little impact on either the initial 
wage offer of the "employers" or the reciprocal effort levels of the "work- 
ers."'125 It is possible, of course, that experiments with extremely high 
stakes would reveal greater deviations from the predictions of fairness 
theory, but, absent that data, a casual review of the relative size of the 
124. Lisa A. Cameron, Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental 
Evidence from Indonesia, 37 Econ. Inquiry 47, 55 (1999). 
125. See Fehr et al., High Stakes, supra note 96, at 9-14 & figs.1 & 2, tbl.2 (testing 
sixty undergraduates at engineering college). 
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contractual surplus in the sample cases does not suggest that the real 
world stakes would, by themselves, undermine the theory. 
2. Untrained Individuals Versus Trained Managers as Experimental 
Subjects. - The second critique of the experimental evidence is particu- 
larly relevant to the use of fairness theory to explain the behavior of con- 
tracting parties: All of the experimental subjects are individuals and not 
firms. Thus, it is unclear to what extent the observed behaviors, even if 
they apply to the general population, are relevant to contracts between 
business entities. One might speculate, for example, that individuals in 
laboratory experiments may respond differently from officers of firms be- 
cause the experimental subjects are not subject to the same pressures to 
make profit-maximizing decisions. Moreover, some recent evidence sug- 
gests that cognitive "errors" can be mitigated substantially and even be 
made to disappear when individuals are asked to perform as actors in 
firms,126 or when the institutional structures permit communication 
within a group of actors and/or require competition between actors.127 
It is important to know the nature of the contracting parties in any partic- 
ular transaction, therefore, before reciprocal fairness can be advanced 
confidently as an explanation for the observed behavior. As table 2 
shows, nearly 50% of the unenforceable agreements in the sample in- 
volved either individuals or closely-held firms on both sides of the transac- 
tion, and in over 75% of the cases one of the parties was either an individ- 
ual or an owner-manager. In only thirteen cases were both litigants large 
corporate entities. Thus, the contracting behaviors observed in the cases 
reflect, in general, the preferences of individual actors and not those of 
corporate officers acting in an agency capacity. 
3. Artificiality ofExperimental Setting. - The third objection to genera- 
lizing these findings to real world contracting behavior is that the subjects 
(who are typically university undergraduates) may be playing a different 
game than that of real world actors. For instance, the fair behavior that is 
observed in the experiments might be driven by the fact that the experi- 
menters can observe the subjects' actions and students may not want to 
appear selfish or greedy to their professors. But this speculation seems 
inconsistent with the basic finding of heterogeneity. There are, after all, 
significant individual differences observed in the subjects' behavior. The 
substantial fraction of subjects who exhibit selfish behavior seem uncon- 
cerned about their professors' opinions. Moreover, when experimenters 
conducted a Gift Exchange Game where effort levels were set exoge- 
126. See Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency 
Relationships, 31 J. Legal Stud. 1, 33 (2002) (finding that corporate agency relationship 
reduces cognitive errors due to endowment effect). 
127. See Tilman Slembeck & Jean-Robert Tyran, Do Institutions Promote Rationality? 
An Experimental Study of the Three-Door Problem 3 (Univ. of St. Gallen, Discussion 
Paper No. 2002-21, Sept. 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/ 
SSRN_ID345721_code021114500.pdf?abstractid=345721) (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (noting that combination of communication and competition completely 
eliminates anomalous choice in "three-door" problem). 
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nously, the wage offers were uniformly "unfair" and approached the pre- 
dictions of the self-interest hypothesis, suggesting that any concern with 
appearing selfish is rather easily overcome.'2" 
In the same vein, however, one might ask whether experimentally 
observed reciprocal fairness is evidence of a universal pattern of behavior 
or whether an individual's economic and social background may influ- 
ence her preferences for fairness. And, if individual circumstances influ- 
ence preferences, is reciprocal behavior better explained by an individ- 
ual's attributes (sex, age, or relative wealth) or by the attributes of the 
group or culture to which she belongs? A recent cross-cultural study us- 
ing the Ultimatum Game in fifteen small-scale societies found that the 
self-interest hypothesis fails in each society studied.l2'" But the study did 
show significant cross-cultural differences, both in the equity of offers and 
the rate of rejections. The findings suggest that observed differences are 
attributable to group-specific conditions such as social institutions or cul- 
tural fairness norms. Specifically, the study shows that the greater the 
payoff from cooperation in economic production for people in the soci- 
ety and the more those people rely on market exchange in their daily 
lives the greater the degree of fairness behaviors (e.g., cooperation, shar- 
ing, and punishment). s This last study is relevant to an inquiry into the 
causes of deliberately incomplete contracts; it suggests that contracts writ- 
ten in advanced market economies will exhibit high levels of reciprocal 
fairness behaviors. The higher the fraction of fair types in the popula- 
tion, all else equal, the more efficient is reciprocal fairness as a means of 
contract enforcement. 
4. Reciprocity as Learned Self-Interest. - The final objection is related 
to this last point. The experimental evidence does not show whether ob- 
served preferences for reciprocity are inherent characteristics or learned 
behaviors, or whether they simply represent the failure of self-interested 
parties to adapt cooperative behavior that works well in repeated interac- 
tions to one-shot laboratory interactions. After all, individuals' decision 
strategies have to work in real world transactions and not in economics 
experiments. So it would be hardly surprising if individuals devise strate- 
gies-or heuristics-that do work in real world transactions, and then fail 
to adjust those strategies to the pure single iteration game in the labora- 
tory. Or, to put it another way, rather than being equally divided be- 
tween self-interested individuals and reciprocally fair ones, the world may 
be divided between self-interested individuals who know how to adjust 
their life strategies in laboratory games and those who don't. 
Another possibility is that cultures generate norms of reciprocity that 
tend to promote individual self-interest. People adhere to the norms be- 
128. Fehr et al., High Stakes, supra note 96, at 2. 
129. Joseph Henrich et al., In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments 
in 15 Small-Scale Societies, Am. Econ. Rev.: AEA Papers and Proceedings, Special Edition 
May 2001, at 73, 77. 
130. Id. at 76-77. 
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cause they believe in them as norms, but the norms themselves are consis- 
tent with self-interest, except in laboratory experiments. This is because, 
over time, parties will be better off if they behave fairly. Following the 
"over time" heuristic consistently, not making distinctions for what ap- 
pear to be single-iteration games, may be a successful, maximizing strat- 
egy. After all, sometimes one might mistake a repeat-play game for a sin- 
gle-iteration game and get punished, or one might pay some unexpected 
reputational price. Thus, it is possible that a rational utility-maximizer 
could easily behave in the way the experimental economists describe as 
reciprocally fair (and not utility-maximizing) simply because the econo- 
mists are not thinking about the costs of categorizing, and miscategoriz- 
ing, transactions. In short, there may be no clear conflict between self- 
interest and the participants' observed behavior. Reciprocal fairness may 
not undermine the self-interest hypothesis as much as extend its reach. 
This argument is quite plausible, indeed, even persuasive, but it is 
irrelevant for the purposes of understanding self-enforcing agreements. 
The important point is that all the available evidence suggests that a sub- 
stantial fraction of individuals act as if they were reciprocally fair in iso- 
lated interactions with relative strangers. Whatever the source of that be- 
havior (whether learned, normative, or intrinsic), it is quite relevant to 
understanding the contracting choices of real world individuals in devel- 
oped market economies who write intentionally incomplete contracts. 
The apparent congruence between the experimental evidence and the 
factual context of the litigated cases thus justifies a further analysis in Part 
III of the fit between the predictions of fairness theory and the observed 
behavior of contracting parties. 
III. EXPLAINING INTENTIONALLY INCOMPLETE AGREEMENTS 
Assume, for the moment, that the experimental evidence of a heter- 
ogenous world populated by both self-interested and reciprocally-fair indi- 
viduals accurately captures the external reality. This evidence of recipro- 
cal fairness then poses two central questions for the legal regulation of 
indefinite agreements: Why do parties write intentionally incomplete 
agreements? And is the presumption of nonenforcement reflected in the 
common law rule of indefiniteness defensible? 
A. Why Do Parties Write Intentionally Incomplete Contracts? 
The sample case data suggest that the incidence of intentionally in- 
complete agreements is significant. Roughly 240 cases were litigated over 
a five-year period and nearly 40% of the sample cases consisted of inten- 
tionally incomplete agreements.'3' The incidence of litigation might be 
explained by the hypothesis that the failure to write legally enforceable 
contracts in transactions of this type actually increases the risk of litiga- 
tion, and thus the sample represents a larger fraction of the population 
131. See supra text accompanying notes 44-48. 
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of such contracts than would be the case with litigation over otherwise 
enforceable contracts. This hypothesis implies that there is a selection 
bias: The litigated cases are more likely to require complex moral judg- 
ments about the nature of the promisor's obligations and the conditions 
precedent to performance. Thus, the parties are unable to settle their 
dispute because of fundamental disagreements about the nature of their 
respective commitments. But the data from the sample cases show, to the 
contrary, that these agreements are relatively simple in form, clear in 
commitment, and thus free from moral ambiguity. Therefore, we should 
discard this hypothesis. 
An alternative hypothesis, and the one advanced in this Article, is 
that parties frequently write indefinite agreements because they are a 
more efficient method of contracting than the alternative. Generalizing 
from the cases, this hypothesis implies that contracting parties frequently 
discard verifiable measures of performance in favor of agreements that 
condition on nonverifiable measures in order to enhance the contractual 
surplus.132 The efficiency hypothesis thus implies that deliberately indefi- 
nite agreements are ubiquitous and that the litigated cases, representing 
instances where the transaction broke down, are a relatively smaller set of 
the total population of such agreements than would be the case with liti- 
gation over enforceable contracts.3ss But the efficiency hypothesis seems 
inconsistent with the basic axioms of contract theory that contracting par- 
ties do not contract over nonverifiable measures of performance and, 
conversely, do contract over verifiable measures of performance where 
transaction costs are relatively low. 
To resolve this apparent contradiction, it is helpful to remember that 
the axioms of contract theory are premised on the assumption that the 
contract in question falls outside the self-enforcing range. Thus, ver- 
ifiability is relevant only when legal enforcement is necessary in order to 
make the parties' promises credible. The puzzle of why parties appear to 
prefer nonverifiable agreements over verifiable contracts can be solved, 
therefore, if these agreements are self-enforcing and if the self-enforcing 
mechanism is more efficient than the alternative of legal enforcement.134 
132. Theorists have proposed several possible explanations for why parties might not 
contract over some verifiable factors. One obvious possibility is that the transaction costs 
of specifying all the possible verifiable states of the world may exceed any expected 
benefits. Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 
Econometrica 755, 776 (1988). Transaction costs do not explain the experimental results 
discussed in Part II.C, however, where subjects who can costlessly elect legal enforcement 
of verifiable terms instead choose unenforceable bonus agreements. 
133. To be sure, there is a general problem of selection bias that suggests caution in 
generalizing from a population of decided cases to the universe of such agreements. I 
suggest below some plausible reasons why parties might seek to litigate such a low 
probability claim. See infra text accompanying notes 139-143. But the fact that the 
direction of any bias is uncertain does lend some credibility to the assumption that the 
incidence of such informal indefinite agreements is significant. 
134. There is a familiar argument that legal enforcement and self-enforcement 
regulate different aspects of the contractual relationship. On this view, legal enforcement 
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The difficulty is that most of the sample cases of intentionally indefinite 
contracts appear to fall outside the self-enforcing range as that domain is 
traditionally understood. The transactions are predominantly one-shot 
interactions between relative strangers.135 A number of the cases do in- 
volve parties with some prior association and with a prospect of repeat 
transactions in the future, but reputation and repeat dealings appear, by 
themselves, insufficient to ensure that the agreement will be honored.'36 
The question, then, is whether reciprocal fairness is sufficient, either by 
itself or in combination with reputation and repeat play, to make the re- 
spective promises credible. 
1. Reciprocal Fairness and Indefinite Bonus Agreements. - Consider the 
"indefinite bonus agreements" discussed above in Part I.C.2. Recall that 
the cases reflect a recurring pattern where a principal offers an agent a 
base compensation and requests an additional, nonverifiable perform- 
ance in return for the promise of a nonverifiable bonus. To make a per- 
suasive case for reciprocal fairness (given our empirical assumptions), we 
need to resolve two subsidiary questions. First, if the parties do not in- 
tend their agreements to be legally enforceable, why do they invest re- 
sources in negotiating these agreements, frequently reducing their re- 
spective promises to a signed writing? To be sure, a promise made by a 
reciprocally fair person is inherently credible and thus worth bargaining 
for. Such a person has a social preference for fairness and is prepared to 
bear costs to achieve an equitable outcome between the parties. But both 
fair and selfish parties will make the same promises. The bonus offer 
itself is thus not a signal of one's type (fair or selfish) because both fair 
functions much as a nuclear umbrella, deterring breach in those states of the world where 
the payoffs from breach are substantial and exceed the range of self-enforcement. The 
other side of the argument is that where the payoffs are relatively low, and reputation and 
repeated interactions are effective, they are a more efficient "conventional" deterrent. See 
Eggleston, Posner & Zeckhauser, supra note 4, at 116 (arguing that "[r]eputational effects, 
combined with renegotiation as circumstances change," explain relative efficiency of 
simple contracts); Scott, Conflict and Cooperation, supra note 10, at 2044-48 (concluding 
that extralegal norms and legal rules "regulate different aspects of the contractual 
relationship in much the same way as conventional and nuclear weapons deter against 
different acts of aggression and noncooperation by the superpowers"). 
135. See infra table 2. I coded thirty-seven of the fifty-five unenforceable cases in the 
sample as discrete rather than relational contracts. While the coding involves some 
judgment, in each of these cases the facts suggest that the parties entered into a single 
transaction and that prior to the agreement they were relative strangers. 
136. Recall that in heterogeneous markets reputation alone is an inadequate means 
of credibly enforcing promises. See supra text accompanying notes 10-13. Even if others 
can observe the interaction, they are unlikely to learn about the true reasons why the 
particular transaction broke down. Without moral clarity, the mere fact of breakdown is 
not sufficient to impose a reputational cost on either party. Moreover, although the 
prospect of repeated interactions is always present to some degree, the discipline of 
conditional cooperation (or "tit for tat") nevertheless depends on the present expectation 
of a future payoff larger than the gains from defecting in the current transaction. Scott, 
Conflict and Cooperation, supra note 10, at 2027-34. 
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and selfish principals will promise the same bonus.'3' Nevertheless, given 
the assumption of heterogeneity (i.e., nearly 40% of the population is 
reciprocally fair), the promise of a bonus is not cheap talk. The bonus 
promise is ex ante credible since there is a positive probability of a sub- 
stantial bonus. Thus, the agent, whether fair or selfish, will exert nonver- 
ifiable effort equal to the expected value of the bonus.'"38 
This argument implies that parties to these agreements do not in- 
tend legal enforcement as a secondary deterrent if the transaction breaks 
down. Thus, the second question: Why do they sue? One answer to this 
question requires us to recall the Fehr and Schmidt theory of inequity 
aversion.'39 Under their theory, fair types have a social preference for 
equality of treatment which implies a willingness to share gains from 
trade as well as a willingness to bear costs in order to punish inequity. 
Reciprocally fair people, in other words, are not wimps. They punish self- 
ish behavior. Even though ex ante there is a substantial probability of 
reciprocity, the assumed proportion of selfish people in the population 
implies that it will be necessary to mete out punishment from time to 
time. Since both fair and selfish agents will exert some nonverifiable ef- 
fort to earn a bonus,140 the theory implies that breakdown will most often 
occur when selfish principals fail to pay a bonus earned by nonverifiable 
performance. This inference supports a testable prediction: Litigation 
primarily occurs when a selfish principal fails to pay a bonus that the 
agent has earned by nonverifiable performance. In such a case, fair 
agents will be willing to bear costs in order to punish the principal. A fair 
agent will be willing to sue even when the expected value of litigation is 
negative.141 The evidence from the sample cases is consistent with this 
137. Since a selfish principal can costlessly copy the promise to give a bonus, there is 
no separating equilibrium. See Fehr et al., Incompleteness, supra note 120, at 12-14. 
138. Note that one of the counterintuitive implications of the Fehr and Schmidt 
model of inequity aversion is that a reciprocally fair agent will shirk more than will a selfish 
agent. This is because the risk of not being paid a bonus by the principal is more costly for 
a fair agent than it is for a selfish agent. A selfish agent will only bear the cost of 
uncompensated effort if the bonus is not paid. But a reciprocally fair agent bears two 
separate costs if the principal does not pay the bonus. In addition to the costs of 
uncompensated efforts, this agent also feels worse because of her social preference for 
equality. Thus, the inequity of the selfish principal receiving a more valuable performance 
than he "paid for" is a further cost that reduces the expected value of the bonus to this 
agent. 
139. See supra text accompanying notes 107-108. 
140. Recall, however, that the nonverifiable efforts of fair agents will be lower than 
those of selfish agents. See supra note 138. 
141. A self-interested plaintiff will not litigate unless the expected value of litigation is 
positive-that is, where the probability of prevailing (P) multiplied by the expected 
damages (D) minus the expected costs of litigation (Cp) is greater than zero (i.e., where 
PD - C, > 0). A fair agent, however, experiences the unfairness of the denied bonus as an 
additional cost. A fair agent will litigate, therefore, so long as the probability of prevailing 
(P) multiplied by the expected damages (D) plus the expected litigation costs to the 
defendant (Cd) exceeds the expected costs of litigation to the plaintiff (C,) (i.e., where PD 
+ Cd > C,). 
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prediction. In each of the indefinite bonus cases, the plaintiff is an agent 
suing her principal for breach of contract and claiming the right to a 
bonus earned by a nonverifiable performance.142 
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the parties to these 
agreements understand ex ante that there is such a low probability of 
enforcement if the transaction breaks down. These are not agreements 
where the parties have expressly announced their intention not to be le- 
gally bound.143 Rather, the nature of these agreements-simple, clear 
undertakings to treat the other party fairly-suggests that the parties are 
relying on the potency of reciprocity rather than on the absence of legal 
enforcement per se. Thus, a more plausible hypothesis is that, from the 
parties' perspective, the ex ante prospect of legal enforcement is ambigu- 
ous. After all, a review of the cases would suggest to any lawyer that some- 
times indefinite contracts are enforced and sometimes they are not. In 
the absence of a systematic, functional analysis, of the sort I have under- 
taken in this Article, there is no reason to believe that the distinction 
between deliberately incomplete agreements and other relational con- 
tracts would be obvious to the parties who are planning these transac- 
tions. By electing to leave the question of legal enforcement ambiguous, 
the parties increase the credibility of the threat of punishment should a 
selfish principal fail to pay a bonus to a deserving agent. 
The discussion thus far suggests that reciprocal fairness offers a supe- 
rior contracting alternative to legal enforcement even in one-shot interac- 
tions between relative strangers. The experimental evidence supports 
three reasons why a self-enforcing bonus agreement is more efficient 
than a legally enforceable contract that conditions only on verifiable mea- 
sures of performance. First, legal enforcement is significantly more costly 
than self-enforcement. Second, reciprocal fairness allows parties to make 
credible promises regarding nonverifiable measures of performance, thus 
increasing joint surplus. In the case of the indefinite bonus agreement, 
the principal has two opportunities to encourage reciprocity-by increas- 
ing the initial base compensation and by promising a bonus. Finally, 
142. To be sure, if the indefinite bonus contract were structured as a unilateral 
contract-a promise to pay a bonus in return for enhanced efforts-the agent could not 
be sued for failing to perform, as the principal did not request a return promise. However, 
it is clear from the facts of most of the cases in the sample that the agreement was 
structured bilaterally; that is, the agent promised to perform nonverifiable tasks and the 
principal promised to pay a nonverifiable bonus. See, e.g., Nat'l Mortgage Corp. v. 
Greenwich Capital Fin. Prods., Inc., 53 Fed. Appx. 510, 511 (10th Cir. 2002); Brines v. 
XTRA Corp., 304 F.3d 699, 700-03 (7th Cir. 2002); Larson v.Johnson, 184 F. Supp. 2d 26, 
30-31 (D. Me. 2002); Sugerman v. MCY Music World, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 2d 316, 319-21 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Cleveland Wrecking Co. v. Hercules Constr. Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 287, 
290 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); Burns v. Dees, 557 S.E.2d 32, 34-35 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Smith v. 
Hammons, 63 S.W.3d 320, 322 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002); Lowinger v. Lowinger, 733 N.Y.S.2d 
33, 35-36 (App. Div. 2001). 
143. Express declarations of an intention not to be legally bound are common, 
particularly in formal letters of intent. Indeed, such clauses, known as "Texaco clauses," 
have become standard in pre-closing documents. Johnston, supra note 46, at 404. 
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these self-enforcing bonus agreements may help to solve a multitasking 
problem in instances where the agent's performance involves both verifi- 
able and nonverifiable tasks. Holmstrom and Milgrom have argued that, 
in multitasking contexts, a flat wage rate for all tasks is more efficient 
than a more complete, incentive contract that links compensation to veri- 
fiable tasks.144 This is because linking verifiable performance measures 
to compensation will cause the agent to substitute away from the nonver- 
ifiable tasks to the compensated verifiable tasks, thus impairing overall 
performance. Self-enforcing bonus agreements "may avoid [this] ineffi- 
cient effort allocation across tasks because the actual bonus can be made 
dependent on the performance of the agent in all tasks."'4"" 
2. Reciprocal Fairness and Repeated Interactions as Self-Enforcing Comple- 
ments. - Even if self-enforcing bonus contracts are more efficient on aver- 
age than legally enforceable contracts that condition only on verifiable 
performance, the assumption of heterogeneity nevertheless implies a 
higher variance in the returns for the self-enforcing alternative. If the 
parties are risk neutral, the variance will not matter and they will predict- 
ably choose the more efficient contract. This is because variance mea- 
sures risk, and risk neutral parties are indifferent to risk.'"46 But one 
might expect many of the individual contracting parties in the sample to 
be risk averse.147 The puzzle, then, is to figure out why individual con- 
tractors might strongly prefer the indefinite bonus alternative.148 One 
plausible hypothesis is that even though cooperative patterns based on 
reputation and repeated interactions may be weak in any particular case, 
individuals learn to reciprocate because reciprocation pays off in so many 
ongoing transactions over time. This suggests that cooperative behavior 
is self-reinforcing. Successful cooperation that generates a reputation for 
trustworthiness or produces returns in ongoing transactions is consistent 
with self-interest and also causes parties to learn to care more about the 
other party's payoff. This, in turn, strengthens an individual's willingness 
144. See Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: 
Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, J.L. Econ. & Org., Vol. 7 Special 
Issue 1991, at 24, 24-27. 
145. Fehr et al., Incompleteness, supra note 120, at 27 (emphasis omitted). 
146. For readers not versed in statistics, variance is a measure of how far a particular 
outcome may deviate from the mean of the distribution. 
147. In eleven of the eighteen indefinite bonus cases, both of the parties were either 
individuals or owner-managers of closely-held firms. See infra table 2. 
148. It is tempting to suggest that the experimental subjects in the Fehr, Klein, and 
Schmidt incomplete contract experiments were risk averse as well. However, while each 
interaction was one-shot, a session of the incomplete contract experiments consisted of ten 
different rounds against ten different contracting partners. See Fehr et al., 
Incompleteness, supra note 120, at 15. Thus, the experimental subjects playing the bonus 
contract could presumably diversify across the entire session. Diversification is not as 
readily accomplished in one-shot interactions in the real world. 
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to reciprocate voluntarily even where the prospect of repeat dealings is 
quite low.149 
Moreover, in the transactions represented by the sample cases, other 
cooperative influences are clearly present to some degree even if they 
may not be sufficient by themselves to make the promises credible. Here 
the hypothesis is that the various self-enforcing mechanisms-reputation, 
repeated interactions, and reciprocity-are complements. There is some 
experimental evidence that supports this claim. Brown, Falk, and Fehr 
compared the effort levels of agents in a one-shot gift exchange game 
with the effort levels in a similar game in which repeated interaction was 
an additional, material incentive.'50 They found that effort levels in the 
one-shot interaction were above the level predicted by pure self-interest 
(thus implying a significant fraction of reciprocal agents) but that the 
repeated interaction condition caused a significant increase in the effort 
level.151 
It is not entirely clear why this complementarity exists between re- 
peated interactions and reciprocal fairness. One conjecture is that the 
properties of incentives created by repeated interactions are very similar 
to the properties of incentives created by invitations to reciprocate. Both 
self-enforcing incentives are imposed implicitly and ex post while the in- 
centives created by legal enforcement are imposed explicitly and ex 
ante."5 Thus, for example, in a repeat game framework a principal can 
punish a selfish agent ex post without risking offending a cooperator by 
announcing in advance a sanction for inadequate efforts. 
Casual empiricism supports the hypothesis that self-enforcing mech- 
anisms are complements and, especially in multitasking contexts, may 
motivate parties to write indefinite bonus contracts. Perhaps the most 
prevalent example of such contracts is in academic employment. Many, if 
not most, academic employment contracts resemble the indefinite bonus 
agreements described above. The principal (say a law school dean) 
makes a legally binding base salary offer to the agent (the individual 
faculty member). The salary is invariant to levels of effort above a bare 
minimum verifiable performance (e.g., avoiding acts of moral turpitude 
or a substantial failure of performance). But many verifiable measures of 
performance are discarded (e.g., demonstrating basic teaching compe- 
tence, prompt performance of specific governance responsibilities, and 
participation in the intellectual life of the institution). At the same time, 
149. Experiments by van Dijk, Sonnemans, and van Winden indicate that successful 
cooperation through repeated interactions strengthens the parties' willingness to take the 
interests of others into account. Frans van Dijk et al., Social Ties in a Public Good 
Experiment, 85 J. Pub. Econ. 275, 291 (2002). 
150. Martin Brown, Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr, Contractual Incompleteness and the 
Nature of Market Interactions (Univ. of Zurich, Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., 
Working Paper No. 38, Feb. 2002), available at http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/ 
iewwp038.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
151. Id. at 1-2. 
152. See Fehr & Falk, Psychological Foundations, supra note 93, at 701-04. 
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the principal requests additional nonverifiable performance (quality re- 
search, devoted attention to teaching, and shared governance responsi- 
bilities, etc.) and promises an indefinite bonus (merit raises in the fu- 
ture). Both the enhanced performance and the bonus are indefinite 
terms and thus are not legally enforceable under the common law rule. 
The standard academic contract is, therefore, largely self-enforcing. 
Clearly, self-interested cooperation makes the respective promises at least 
partially credible. Repeated interactions (merit raises awarded in the past 
motivate nonverifiable performance in anticipation of raises in the fu- 
ture) as well as reputation (the dean's reputation for good judgment and 
even-handedness) motivate nonverifiable performance by faculty. But 
both reputation and repeated interactions are insufficient by themselves 
to make the promises to perform and to reward performance fully credi- 
ble. Faculty can move to other institutions thus creating an end-game 
problem that undermines the discipline of repeated interactions. Moreo- 
ver, reputation is relatively weak as a basis of enforcement because of 
strong norms against sharing bonus information among faculty. Thus, it 
is plausible that the additional incentive effects of reciprocity comple- 
ment the self-enforcing patterns of cooperation based on reputation and 
repeat play. In combination, these effects motivate a contractual design 
that dominates the alternatives of a trust contract (lockstep raises) or an 
enforceable incentive contract that ties compensation to verifiable tasks 
such as the number of students taught or number of papers published 
(creating a multitasking problem).5" In these and similar settings, there- 
fore, reciprocity reinforces other cooperative influences and thus offers 
parties many more opportunities to use self-enforcing agreements rather 
than legally enforceable contracts. 
3. Comfort Agreements as Screen for Self-Enforcement. - The assumption 
of heterogeneity-some folks behave fairly and some exhibit self-inter- 
est-implies that intentionally indefinite agreements (that rely exclu- 
sively on reciprocal fairness) are not first-best efficient. That conclusion 
is supported by both the experimental evidence and the evidence of 
transactional breakdown from the sample of litigated cases. The evi- 
dence of inefficiencies in self-enforcing bonus contracts may offer a plau- 
sible explanation for the common use of legally unenforceable "comfort 
agreements." To understand why, recall from the sample data set that 
these "comfort agreements" are deliberately indefinite agreements that 
look to the formation of a future relationship. Some are in the form of 
formal letters of intent but most are more informal agreements.154 They 
153. The statement in the text is confirmed by a survey of over one hundred law 
school deans that I conducted while serving as President of the American Law Deans 
Association from 1999-2001. More than 80% of the responding deans reported that 
faculty compensation was determined by a base salary plus indefinite merit increases based 
on nonverifiable efforts (high quality scholarship, teaching, etc.). 
154. See infra table 2. 
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include agreements to lease space in a shopping mall,155 to execute an 
executive compensation agreement,'56 to sell an insurance agency,1'57 to 
enter into a partnership,'58 to license the construction of a golf course,'59 
and to invest in a proposed gambling casino.'60 In each case, the courts 
have held that the indefinite terms in the comfort agreement constitute 
an unenforceable "agreement to agree."''61 
The question we have posed earlier recurs: Why do parties write 
these intentionally unenforceable agreements? It is well known that 
more formal letters of intent are part of a continuous negotiation pro- 
cess.162 The parties' intentions are to go to the next step and convert the 
agreement into an enforceable contract. Typically, the enforceable con- 
tract is complex and final negotiation turns on several variables unknown 
to the parties at the time the letter of intent is executed. In these cases, 
therefore, the parties may be learning about each other's competence16 
or waiting to see if a market shift makes the venture less attractive.'64 But 
most of the comfort agreements in the sample cases do not fit the con- 
ventional letter-of-intent model. The informal agreement and the future 
transaction are commonly separated in time and are not part of an ongo- 
ing negotiation process. Moreover, the comfort agreement, like the in- 
definite bonus contract, is simple in form and offers clearly defined op- 
portunities to reciprocate.165" One hypothesis is that these agreements, 
rather than (or in addition to) being designed for parties to learn about 
each other's competence or about market conditions, are designed to 
allow parties to learn about each other's taste for reciprocal fairness. To 
be sure, self-enforcing bonus agreements are more efficient on average 
than legally enforceable agreements that condition only on verifiable 
measures of performance. But the assumption of heterogeneity means 
that individual promisees risk responding with enhanced efforts to a self- 
ish promisor who subsequently fails to pay any bonus. This inefficiency 
could be reduced if the parties were able effectively to screen for recipro- 
cally fair contracting partners. 
155. OfficeMax, Inc. v. Sapp, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1083 (M.D. Ga. 2001). 
156. Stout v. Fisher Indus., 603 N.W.2d 52, 54-55 (N.D. 1999). 
157. Hunt v. Coker, 741 So. 2d 1011, 1013 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). 
158. Bergman v. DeIulio, 826 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). 
159. Homestead Golf Club, Inc. v. Pride Stables, 224 F.3d 1195, 1198 (10th Cir. 2000). 
160. Mays v. Trump Ind., Inc., 255 F.3d 351, 354-55 (7th Cir. 2001). 
161. See infra table 2. 
162. See Johnston, supra note 46, at 449-50. 
163. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 269-71 (Wis. 1965) 
(franchisor increases capital contribution requirements following observation of potential 
franchisee's trial period as store manager); Johnston, supra note 46, at 401-03. 
164. See Ronald Gilson 8& Alan Schwartz, Understanding MACs and MAEs 42-44 
(Apr. 30, 2003), at http://www.yale.edu/law/ccl/papers/mergerl5.pdf (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("The traditional [material adverse 
change clause] permits a buyer to exit when a material adverse change or effect would 
make the deal unprofitable for it.") 
165. See supra text accompanying notes 78-85. 
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The willingness to make an indefinite promise that conditions on 
nonverifiable factors is not, by itself, a reliable signal that the promisor is 
a reciprocally fair type. As we have seen, selfish promisors will copy the 
signal since the invitation to reciprocate will induce greater efforts from 
the promisee and thus greater returns to the promisor. But the typical 
comfort agreement has an additional feature. The agreement itself cre- 
ates opportunities to reciprocate in advance of the formalization of the 
relationship between the parties. Recall, for example, the facts of Hunt v. 
Coker,166 where the parties entered into a comfort agreement expressing 
their joint desire for Coker to sell, and Hunt to buy, Coker's insurance 
agency.'167' The events that followed are instructive. Upon execution of 
the agreement, Hunt relocated his agency to Coker's building. Both 
Coker and Hunt worked their own accounts, essentially operating sepa- 
rate businesses but sometimes brokering policies together. Over time, 
Coker became unhappy with the quality of Hunt's work and informed 
him the offer to sell would not be honored.'6s 
Why would Coker be concerned about selfish behavior by Hunt dur- 
ing this interim period?169 Recall that the purchase price agreed upon by 
the parties was one of several alternatives, each of which was based on the 
percentage of commissions that renewed over five, six, or seven years. 
Thus, the sale price of the agency was directly linked to Hunt's nonverifi- 
able efforts. Viewed in this light, the transition period created by the 
comfort agreement takes on new meaning. Coker's numerous opportu- 
nities to observe Hunt's behavior may have served as a means of screen- 
ing for a reciprocally fair business partner. Hunt's subsequent shirking 
then would have signaled that he was a "selfish" type and that the ulti- 
mate sale agreement would not be self-enforcing. 
There are two ways that comfort agreements such as the one in Hunt 
can function as a screening device. First, the agreement provides oppor- 
tunities to observe the behavior of the promisor in response to opportu- 
nities to reciprocate. This gives the promisee the opportunity to acquire 
personal knowledge of the character of the promisor.170 To be sure, 
some promisors may attempt to "act fair" during the interim period and 
return to selfish behavior when the future relationship is cemented. But, 
in addition to observation, the comfort agreement serves to separate in 
166. 741 So. 2d 1011 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). 
167. See supra text accompanying note 79. "The agreement provided that Hunt 
would consolidate his location with Coker as soon as possible with each party paying their 
own expenses . . . until the date of sale." 741 So. 2d at 1013. 
168. Hunt, 741 So. 2d at 1013. 
169. There is no evidence of precisely what behavior by Hunt led to Coker's decision 
to terminate the relationship. Coker could have been unhappy either because he observed 
that Hunt was an incompetent insurance broker or because he observed Hunt shirking. 
My point is only that screening for shirking and other selfish behavior is a plausible, and 
additional, reason why parties enter into such agreements. 
170. George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. Econ. 488, 500 (1970). 
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time the opportunity to reciprocate from the subsequent transaction that 
is ultimately contemplated. It is thus an example of the expenditure of 
time for the purposes of communication.17' In this case, potential trans- 
actors are not only subject to observation but they must spend considera- 
ble time in the process of executing an agreement that is only self-enforc- 
ing.172 Since reciprocally fair individuals are able to capture the returns 
to general information about their type through an enhanced reputation 
for cooperation, they are more willing to spend resources to provide this 
information.17" Much how a person's willingness to wait in a queue for 
tickets to an event signals her desire to attend the show, the expenditure 
of time performing a nonverifiable promise is itself a signal; in this case it 
may signal a preference for reciprocity.174 
In sum, while the available evidence is sufficient only for intelligent 
speculation, the sample of litigated cases suggests that the widespread use 
of informal comfort agreements may be a function of their properties as 
screens for voluntarily cooperative behavior. Parties entering relation- 
ships in which measures of performance are nonverifiable will benefit 
from personal knowledge of the fairness preferences of their contracting 
partners. Such knowledge will permit them to enter transactions in 
which key measures of performance are nonverifiable without serious 
risk. 
B. Should Courts Refuse to Enforce Intentionally Incomplete Agreements? 
In the preceding discussion I have argued that the theory of recipro- 
cal fairness significantly expands the domain and the potency of self-en- 
171. A. Michael Spence, Time and Communication in Economic and Social 
Interaction, 87 Q.J. Econ. 651, 651-52 (1973). 
172. Many formal letters of intent indicate explicitly that the parties do not intend to 
be legally bound, thus reducing, but not eliminating, the threat of subsequent litigation by 
a disappointed promisee. Johnston, supra note 46, at 403-04. None of the informal 
comfort agreements in the litigated cases contained a term expressly declining legal 
enforcement. It is puzzling why this is so, particularly in those agreements where legal 
counsel assisted in the drafting process. One inference is that parties prefer to leave the 
question of potential legal enforcement deliberately ambiguous. See supra text 
accompanying note 143. 
173. Another way of expressing the point in the text is that a selfish party can perhaps 
dupe a single promisee and capture a larger surplus but, once her selfish nature is revealed 
(the bonus is not paid), she is unable to replicate the transaction at low cost. On the other 
hand, a reciprocally fair party will not only earn a portion of the enhanced surplus in this 
transaction, but, by revealing her type (the bonus is paid), she will develop a reputation for 
fairness that can be exploited at lower cost in future transactions. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
The Theory of "Screening," Education, and the Distribution of Income, 65 Am. Econ. Rev. 
283, 287 (1975). 
174. For a similar analysis that focuses on psychological phenomena to explain self- 
selection of trustworthy individuals who opt in to closely-held corporations, see Margaret 
M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of 
Corporate Law, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1735, 1803-07 (2001); see also Eric A. Posner, Law and 
Social Norms 49-67, 23, 25 (2000) (arguing that gift giving and styles of dress may serve to 
signal parties' trustworthiness). 
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forcing contracts. But the evidence also shows that self-enforcement does 
not achieve first-best efficiency. Given a heterogeneous population of 
selfish and fair individuals, the self-sanctions for deterring breach of 
promise are imperfect. Thus, a logical question is why shouldn't the legal 
system combine reciprocity with legal enforcement? Would it not be 
more efficient (and more fair) for courts to fill gaps in intentionally in- 
complete agreements where the evidence ex post reveals that the transac- 
tion broke down (presumably because one of the parties was selfish)? 
To make the question concrete, return to the contracting example 
of the New York buyer and the Indian seller described above in Part II.C. 
Assume that the New York buyer elects the self-enforcing indefinite con- 
tract and that the seller delivers goods that are unsatisfactory to the 
buyer. The buyer, in turn, declines to pay a bonus. Subsequently, the 
buyer sues for breach of contract, seeking rescission and damages, and 
the seller counterclaims for a "reasonable" bonus. Should the law seek to 
complete this contract for the parties? 
To answer this question, a court must select between two distinct ap- 
proaches to the problem of indefinite agreements. One option is to fol- 
low the modern presumption and enforce the agreement notwithstand- 
ing the indefinite terms. For example, a court could order a "fair" result 
by imposing an equitable adjustment-a reasonable bonus in return for a 
reasonable effort-taking all of the contextual factors into account as 
they appear at the time of adjudication.175 This outcome follows from 
the premise that these intentionally indefinite contracts create reciprocal 
duties and courts should enforce those duties when the parties subse- 
quently cannot agree.176 Alternatively, a court could follow the prece- 
dent of the cases from the sample and dismiss both the buyer's claim for 
damages and the seller's claim for a reasonable bonus on the grounds of 
175. Contract law typically fills such gaps with broad standards of reasonableness 
when the conditions for more precise rules are not met. In fact, reasonableness standards 
are common because the conditions for creating efficient bright-line default rules are very 
difficult to meet. See Schwartz 8& Scott, supra note 2. 
176. To enforce this agreement, the court must determine what a "reasonable" effort 
by the seller would entail and, if that performance is satisfied, what "reasonable" bonus by 
the buyer is required. The reasonableness standard thus provides a basis for enforcing 
either the additional effort obligations of the seller, the bonus payment obligations of the 
buyer, or both. A court might use either an ex ante or an ex post perspective in enforcing 
these agreements. If the court simply fills in the gaps ex post, subsequent courts (and 
statutory drafters) ideally should not be tempted to reify the result in the particular case as 
a default standard. Ex post adjustment, in short, argues for a "black box" style of 
decisionmaking. It follows that courts following this approach should be hospitable to 
attempts by later parties to alter or eliminate the emergent standard in their contracts. 
The ex ante approach aims to create defaults that would be useful to subsequent parties 
writing similar agreements. Unfortunately, default standards of reasonableness seldom are 
good fits. In the first place, they create moral hazard. Even where the resource costs to the 
state are low, such default terms are inefficient to the extent that they specify terms that 
condition on unobservable or unverifiable information. To be sure, subsequent parties 
can, in theory, reject the state rules and select their own alternatives. But even if opting 
out is relatively easy, an inefficient default functions as a "tax" on private contracting. 
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indefiniteness. Under this common law approach, the evidence that the 
material, verifiable terms were not specified would generate an inference 
that the parties did not intend to be legally bound. The claim would be 
dismissed, and the losses would lie where they fall. 
Which approach is best? At first blush, the robust evidence of recip- 
rocal behavior seems to require that the law acknowledge explicitly the 
value of reciprocal fairness. One might argue, for example, that courts 
should create default standards of reasonableness to bolster the implicit 
patterns of reciprocity that have broken down in this particular in- 
stance."'77 Or, alternatively, one might suggest that, where a contract cre- 
ates an opportunity for beneficial reciprocity, a court should enforce such 
a duty by imposing an equitable adjustment when one of the parties has 
apparently behaved selfishly."7 
For several reasons, however, the theory of reciprocal fairness sup- 
ports adherence to the common law indefiniteness doctrine. First, the 
prospect of legal enforcement can create a moral hazard risk that may 
deter parties from writing self-enforcing agreements. To see why, return 
again to the example of the Indian seller and the New York buyer. As- 
sume the parties have chosen the indefinite bonus contract. Now assume 
that courts abandon the common law rule on indefiniteness and adopt 
the modern presumption of enforcement. This implies that a court will, 
with positive probability, entertain a breach of contract claim and try to 
decide what is fair. The prospect that the agreement might be legally 
enforceable creates an enhanced risk of cheating by the seller. A seller 
who produces low quality goods may now threaten to sue for breach of 
contract, claiming that she produced high quality goods and was entitled 
to a bonus. Since high quality is not verifiable, the buyer faces an en- 
hanced risk of hold-up. The problem is that the legal enforcement rule 
itself creates a motive for a seller to claim the right to a bonus payment 
for a nonverifiable performance, apart from any assumption that fair sell- 
ers will sue because they are angry. Given what a court will do, litigation 
can maximize any seller's expected profits and thus make credible the 
hold-up threat. 
Moreover, if a court will potentially enforce a bonus promise against 
the buyer where the seller has, in fact, delivered low quality goods, it no 
longer is rational for buyers to offer the intentionally incomplete bonus 
agreement.179" Thus, the prospect of legal enforcement-and its associ- 
177. See, e.g., Richard E. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long- 
Term Supply Contracts, 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 369, 420-22 (1981) (arguing that court-imposed 
price adjustment is preferable to efficient risk allocation). 
178. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An 
Analysis Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 Duke L.J. 1, 4-14. 
179. To be sure, a promisee will sometimes expressly agree to a "best efforts" or 
"reasonable efforts" contract in which a court may potentially be asked to determine 
whether the efforts given by the promisor were "best" or "reasonable." Typically, such 
levels of effort will be nonverifiable. But parties generally will choose such broad standards 
that condition on nonverifiable factors only where the contract is otherwise structured so 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Thu, 21 Jan 2016 19:20:53 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1688 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:1641 
ated moral hazard risk-may motivate the buyer to abandon the bonus 
agreement altogether. This would be an inferior outcome because, as we 
have seen, the self-enforcing bonus agreement is socially efficient: High 
quality generates a greater surplus than low quality and there is a positive 
probability that the contract will generate high quality. 
Now consider the alternative: The court denies relief on the 
grounds of indefiniteness; it cannot verify whether the seller delivered 
high quality goods and thus cannot grant a remedy. The nonenforce- 
ment approach eliminates the hold-up threat and restores the buyer's in- 
centive to offer the more efficient self-enforcing bonus contract. In 
short, any enforcement rule (or standard) that conditions on nonverifi- 
able factors (such as high quality) will produce an inferior outcome to a 
nonenforcement rule that leaves the parties room for reciprocity. 
The preceding argument shows that an attempt to enforce deliber- 
ately incomplete contracts by adopting a broad standard of reasonable- 
ness or good faith is socially inefficient. A further question is whether the 
same conclusion holds if courts attempt to limit legal enforcement to the 
verifiable terms in agreements that otherwise depend on self-enforcement. 
Recall that in the example of the Indian seller and the New York buyer 
the parties initially faced a choice between an obligationally complete 
contract (merchantable quality goods for a $50,000 price) and an indefi- 
nite bonus contract (a $40,000 base price with a bonus of $20,000 in re- 
turn for the delivery of high quality goods). Now suppose that the parties 
reach an agreement that combines the features of both options. The 
buyer offers a price of $50,000 with a $10,000 bonus if the seller delivers 
high quality goods satisfactory to the buyer. In addition, the contract 
specifies that the buyer can recover $10,000 in liquidated damages if the 
seller does not provide at least merchantable quality goods. Merchanta- 
ble quality, recall, is verifiable to a court.18s In this example, then, the 
parties have agreed to a verifiable obligation that, if severable from the 
indefinite bonus, would be legally enforceable. Assume the seller delivers 
nonmerchantable goods that do not "pass without objection in the 
trade"''1 and the buyer seeks recovery of the stipulated damages. The 
seller claims, in turn, that the entire agreement is indefinite and 
unenforceable. 
It is tempting to suggest that granting a remedy to the buyer in this 
instance is socially optimal. After all, this portion of the agreement was 
definite and certain. The breach by the seller does not implicate the in- 
definite promise of a bonus for high quality performance. But the critical 
question is whether legal enforcement of the verifiable terms would ad- 
versely affect the potency of reciprocity as a means of enforcing the 
that the party with discretion has incentives to take both parties' interests into account, 
thus obviating the need for courts to evaluate the nonverifiable measures of performance. 
See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2; Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 164. 
180. See supra notes 116-117 and accompanying text. 
181. U.C.C. ? 2-314(2)(a) (2002). 
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nonverifiable terms of the agreement. In other words: How do explicit, 
legal incentives to abide by the terms of a contract interact with motiva- 
tions of fairness and reciprocity? 
A recent series of experiments by Fehr and Gaichter using a variation 
on the Gift Exchange Game examines this question.'" In the control 
version of these experiments, buyers offer a trust contract at a stipulated 
price and a desired level of effort. If the seller accepts this offer, she is 
free to choose her actual level of effort. The higher the level of effort 
chosen, the more costly to the seller. In each experimental session there 
are eight sellers and six buyers, each of whom can contract with only a 
single seller.'8s All participants know that there is an excess supply of 
sellers. Thus, in principle, the buyers can enforce very low prices and 
selfish sellers have no incentive to provide any effort above the minimum 
level. The results, by now predictable, are that many buyers in fact offer 
quite generous prices, and many sellers respond with greater efforts, sub- 
stantially above the selfish choice.'84 In the second version of the experi- 
ment, the buyers are allowed to impose a sanction (e.g., a monetary fine) 
if the seller shirks on her effort obligation.'"5 Thus, this version in es- 
sence adds the dimension of legal enforcement to the incomplete trust 
contract just described (one might, for example, think of the fine as dam- 
ages for breach of contract). The results show that the average price of- 
fered by buyers and the average effort of sellers is lower in the presence of 
explicit, legally enforceable sanctions. Without legal enforcement, recip- 
rocal fairness generates high levels of performance. But once the interac- 
tion is backed by legal sanctions, reciprocity declines and overall perform- 
182. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaichter, Do Incentive Contracts Undermine Voluntary 
Cooperation? (Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 
34, 2002), available at http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp34.pdf (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Fehr & Gaichter, Incentive Contracts]. See generally 
Fehr & Gfichter, Fairness and Retaliation, supra note 113. 
183. Experiments have shown that prices and quality of efforts are the same 
regardless of whether the number of sellers is below or above the number of buyers. This 
indicates that competition has little or no effect on outcomes in these gift exchange 
markets. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, Do Market Conditions Affect Gift Exchange? 
Evidence from Experimental Markets with Excess Supply and Excess Demand 14-21, 25 
(Instituto de Anilisis Economico, Working Paper No. 522.02, Dec. 2001), available at 
http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2002/52202.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
184. In a large field study, Truman Bewley provided empirical evidence supporting 
the results of the Fehr and Gaichter experiments. See Truman F. Bewley, Why Wages Don't 
Fall During a Recession (1999); Truman F. Bewley, A Depressed Labor Market as 
Explained by Participants, 85 Am, Econ. Rev. 250 (1995). The managers who were 
interviewed stressed that "workers have so many opportunities to take advantage of 
employers that it is not wise to depend on coercion and financial incentives alone as 
motivators." Id. at 252. Employers believe that other motivators are necessary, which are 
best thought of as having to do with generosity. See Fehr & Gichter, Incentive Contracts, 
supra note 182, at 11. 
185. The probability of verifying shirking is set at one-third and determined by a roll 
of the dice. See Fehr & Gaichter, Incentive Contracts, supra note 182, at 11. 
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ance is reduced.l86 This result suggests that implicit incentives based on 
reciprocity and explicit, legally enforceable performance duties may in- 
deed be in conflict with each other.'"87 In particular, explicit incentives 
may "crowd out" behavior based on reciprocal fairness.'as 
The "crowding out" phenomenon observed in the experiments may 
seem counterintuitive, particularly since other experiments have shown 
that a combination of self-enforcing incentives actually increases con- 
tracting efficiency."'9 Why might reciprocal fairness and repeated inter- 
actions be complements while reciprocal fairness and legal enforcement 
are substitutes? One conjecture is based on the fact that legal enforce- 
ment is structured as a zero-sum game in which the promisee threatens 
ex ante to sanction the promisor for subsequent nonperformance. The 
explicit, ex ante nature of legal sanctions may thus undermine the instinct 
to reciprocate. Fair types may simply regard legal enforcement as unfair 
since they are willing to reciprocate voluntarily, while selfish types may 
interpret the threat of sanction through legal enforcement as a signal 
186. The level of effort by sellers and amount of voluntary cooperation were lower in 
the obligationally complete contract because: 1) shirking by sellers increased even where 
the expected costs of shirking exceeded the expected returns to the seller; and 2) 
reciprocity in the form of generous offers by buyers and reciprocating efforts by sellers 
vanished almost completely. Where the expected returns to shirking were positive, sellers 
chose the minimum quality in the vast majority of cases, and, when buyers offered more 
generous prices above the minimum, sellers did not reciprocate with greater efforts. See 
Fehr & GAichter, Incentive Contracts, supra note 182, at 15-18. 
187. Other experiments have also found that combining legal enforcement with 
nonlegal mechanisms-such as social norms-can have counterproductive effects. See, 
e.g., Iris Bohnet et al., More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and 
Crowding, 95 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 131, 141 (2001) (demonstrating that in contract 
enforcement experiment in which probabilities of sanctions for breach are variable, and 
propensity to perform is nonmonotonic, performance is higher at both low and high 
probability states and lower at intermediate probabilities of enforcement); Uri Gneezy & 
Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. Legal Stud. 1, 15-16 (2000) (reporting that 
introduction of price incentives for parents who are late picking up their children from 
day care increases frequency of late-coming parents). There is also an extensive literature 
in social psychology that considers the crowding out of intrinsic motivation by extrinsic 
monetary rewards. See, e.g., Edward L. Deci et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments 
Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 125 Psychol. Bull. 627 
(1999). In this literature the monetary incentive is set exogenously by the experimenter 
and not by a principal. Thus, it does not test for reciprocity and voluntary cooperation. 
188. The experimental research on crowding out is still in a preliminary stage. In 
particular, economists do not know why and under which conditions reciprocity and 
voluntary cooperation will be undermined by legal enforcement. Fehr and Gichter have 
shown that framing effects influence the crowding out phenomenon. Thus, for example, 
the levels of reciprocity are considerably greater if the explicit incentive is framed as a 
bonus from a base offer rather than as a fine for nonperformance, even though the 
economic effects of the "carrot" are equal to that of the "stick." See Fehr & Gachter, 
Incentive Contracts, supra note 182, at 26-30. 
189. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing complementarity between reciprocal fairness 
and repeated interactions). 
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that the promisee is unlikely to be a reciprocator.19t The same explicit 
threat does not exist in the case of repeated interactions where the im- 
plicit sanction (terminating the relationship) is imposed ex post after the 
shirking has been observed. In that sense, ex post punishment may be 
perceived as "fairer" than the ex ante announcement of damages for 
breach. 
The evidence that voluntary cooperation may be undermined by ex- 
plicit legal obligations is a further argument in favor of the formalist ap- 
proach to contract law that has been historically followed by the common 
law. The instinct to preserve a space for reciprocal fairness may explain 
the common law preference for simple, binary, winner-take-all legal 
rules.'•1 Within the framework of a few clear rules, parties can respond 
to implicit opportunities to behave reciprocally, even in one-shot interac- 
tions. Obviously, these effects are magnified in relational settings in 
which parties can "lock in" to a long-term cooperative equilibrium.'92 
Notwithstanding the power of reciprocal fairness, contractual break- 
downs nonetheless occur, in part because as the experimental evidence 
suggests there is both self-interest and reciprocity in the world. But given 
such a world, the puzzle of indefinite contracts may now be solved. Con- 
tracting parties simply may have learned to behave under two sets of 
rules: an explicit (rigid) set of rules for legal enforcement and an im- 
plicit (flexible) set of rules for self-enforcement. It may be that the lesson 
for courts is that any effort to judicialize preferences for fairness will de- 
stroy the very informality that makes reciprocity so effective in the first 
instance.93" The experimental evidence suggests that the contemporary 
academic instinct to have courts fill gaps in incomplete contracts with 
broadly applicable standards of reasonableness and fair treatment may 
actually undermine the very norms of fairness that the legal system seeks 
to advance. If so, it is important that neither courts nor academic com- 
mentators generalize about the impotency of reciprocal fairness from the 
litigated cases, as these disputes only arise when the implicit incentives 
have broken down. Litigated cases, therefore, give no clue of the power 
of reciprocal fairness in the many situations where these social prefer- 
190. The story that explains crowding out is based only on intelligent speculation. A 
legal sanction is always framed as a threat. To the extent that intentions matter in 
motivating reciprocity, the ex ante threat may be interpreted as a hostile intention. A 
liquidated damages clause in a contract may thus be perceived as an indication of distrust. 
If sellers perceive the damages clause as a hostile act, they may be less willing to put forth 
the same quality of efforts as compared to a situation in which the first mover sends a 
trusting signal. Fehr & Gaichter, Incentive Contracts, supra note 182, at 14. 
191. See Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial 
Contracts, 19 J. Legal Stud. 597, 611-15 (1990) [hereinafter Scott, Relational Theory of 
Default Rules] (analyzing doctrines of perfect tender, mistake, excuse, and breach as 
binary legal rules that assign risks on all-or-nothing basis). 
192. Id. at 614; Scott, Conflict and Cooperation, supra note 10, at 2026. 
193. See Scott, Relational Theory of Default Rules, supra note 191, at 615 (making the 
complementary point that judicializing extralegal norms will undermine their 
effectiveness). 
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ences may have been effective in enforcing indefinite agreements, even 
between strangers. Understood in the broader context of a system that 
relies on both legal enforcement and self-enforcement, the wisdom of the 
common law approach becomes clearer.'"94 
CONCLUSION 
The doctrine that declares unenforceable an agreement that is un- 
certain or indefinite in its material terms is a core principle of the com- 
mon law of contracts. Conventional academic wisdom holds that this 
doctrine is an artifact of a discredited legal formalism. It is assumed that 
contemporary American courts work to enforce incomplete contracts by 
filling gaps with broad standards of reasonableness and good faith. But 
in an important class of cases the conventional wisdom is misleading. A 
systematic review of this case law shows that courts continue to adhere to 
the indefiniteness doctrine, declining to enforce contracts where the par- 
ties have intentionally declined to condition performance on verifiable 
measures that could have been specified in the agreement at relatively 
low cost. 
This evidence is puzzling in two distinct respects. First, these inten- 
tionally incomplete agreements are inconsistent with the assumptions of 
contract theory that contracting parties will discard nonverifiable mea- 
sures of performance but will contract over low-cost, verifiable measures. 
Second, the judicial decisions not to enforce these agreements are incon- 
sistent with the assumption of most contemporary theorists that courts 
can (and do) enhance the fairness and efficiency of contractual exchange 
by filling contractual gaps whenever possible. 
The alternative of self-enforcement is the most plausible explanation 
for why parties intentionally write indefinite agreements even in isolated 
transactions between relative strangers. Where self-enforcement is effec- 
tive, it is more efficient than legal enforcement. The traditional under- 
standing is that self-enforcement is limited to contexts where reputation 
or repeated interactions are sufficient to make promises credible. Recent 
work in experimental economics suggests, however, that reciprocal fair- 
ness is a potent additional means of self-enforcement. Whether recipro- 
cal fairness is a learned behavior that derives from the benefits of cooper- 
ation in repeated interactions or an intrinsic motivation remains an open 
question. But the important point is that the evidence suggests that the 
domain of self-enforcing contracts extends to environments in which a 
reputation for trustworthiness and the discipline of ongoing relationships 
are relatively weak forces. Intentionally incomplete contracts of the sort 
194. Id. at 614-15. The formal contract law that has survived the common law process 
serves as an effective complement to the more flexible mechanism of reciprocal fairness. 
Any effort to expand the law by adopting broad legal standards requiring "reasonable" 
behavior and/or "fair treatment" may (perversely) crowd out the opportunities for implicit 
enforcement through reciprocity. 
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routinely dismissed by courts have a common feature: The agreements 
are simple in form, clear in commitment, and structured to create oppor- 
tunities for parties to reciprocate in ways that expand the contractual 
surplus. 195 
One of the robust findings of the fairness experiments is that we live 
in a heterogeneous world in which a significant fraction of individuals 
behave as if they are reciprocally fair and a comparable fraction respond 
only to self-interest. This phenomenon of heterogeneity provides an ex- 
planation for another category of intentionally incomplete agreements. 
Parties commonly write informal "agreements to agree" (what I have 
termed "comfort agreements"). Among other purposes, these agree- 
ments can function as means of screening for reciprocally fair business 
partners by providing an opportunity for each party to observe the 
other's character over time. 
Legal analysts have a further concern: Should courts intervene to 
enforce these indefinite agreements when reciprocity fails? The answer 
to this legal policy question depends on whether legal enforcement is a 
complement to, or a substitute for, self-enforcement through reciprocity. 
The available evidence suggests that legally enforcing these troublesome 
agreements may be counterproductive. If courts use general standards of 
fairness to enforce nonverifiable promises, parties will abandon this form 
of agreement. Even where courts only enforce the verifiable promises in 
these agreements, there is some evidence that any judicial intervention 
crowds out the instinct to reciprocate. To the extent this is true, legal 
enforcement will have negative effects in reducing the potency of recipro- 
cal fairness in the great majority of cases where self-enforcement is cur- 
rently effective. 
The evidence that legal sanctions and voluntary cooperation may be 
incompatible both explains and justifies the determination of contempo- 
rary courts to police strictly the boundary between the two domains. Per- 
haps the puzzle of deliberately incomplete contracts is only a conundrum 
for academic lawyers, whose occupational hazard is to assume that with- 
out law there is no social order. Contrary to that conventional assump- 
tion, there are strong reasons to believe that fairness matters, and be- 
cause of those reasons the law should leave space for reciprocity to work. 
195. The key features of these agreements-simplicity and moral clarity-may best 
explain how parties can tell whether they are in a legally enforceable environment, where 
fairness is crowded out, or a self-enforcing environment, where reciprocity has room to 
function. Where transactions are complex and the respective promises interrelated, a 
failure to perform a promise may not be obvious and thus reciprocity may not serve to 
make the promises credible. Given the highly interactive nature of the obligations of each 
party to a complex transaction, it may be difficult to know, for example, whether one 
party's refusal to respond cooperatively in a particular case represents unfair or selfish 
behavior or an appropriately measured retaliatory response to an earlier instance of 
noncooperation by the other. These complex interactions are the sorts of agreements that 
commercial parties typically reduce to legally enforceable obligations. Scott, Conflict and 
Cooperation, supra note 10, at 2050-51. 
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TABLE 1: 
ENFORCEABLE INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS 
Type of 
State Case Citation Transaction196 Parties1 
Cal. Denver D. Darling, Inc. v. Controlled Relational Closely-Held Firm v. 
Environments Construction, Inc., 108 Closely-Held Firm 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 213 (Ct. App. 2001) 
Cal. Krantz v. BT Visual Images, L.L.C., Relational Individual v. Large 
107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 209 (Ct. App. Firm 
2001) 
Conn. Detroit Institute of Arts Founders Relational Large Firm v. 
Society v. Rose, 127 F. Supp. 2d 117 Individual 
(D. Conn. 2001) 
Conn. Bartomeli v. Bartomeli, 783 A.2d Relational Individual v. Individual 
1050 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) 
Conn. Willow Funding Co. v. Grencom Relational Large Firm v. Large 
Associates, 779 A.2d 174 (Conn. App. Firm 
Ct. 2001) 
D.C. Howell v. ev.United States, 51 Fed. Cl. Relational Closely-Held Firm v. 
516 (2002) Large Firm 
D.C. Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc. v. Relational Large Firm v. Large 
Barram, 226 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. Firm 
2000) 
D.C. Affordable Elegance Travel, Inc. v. Relational Large Firm v. Large 
Worldspan, L.P., 774 A.2d 320 (D.C. Firm 
2001) 
Ga. Quadron Software International Relational Large Firm v. 
Corp. v. Plotseneder, 568 S.E.2d 178 Individual 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2002) 
Gav.Jones v. Hill, 539 S.E.2d 893 (Ga. Ct. Relational Individual v. Individual 
App. 2000) 
Ga. Kueffer Crane & Hoist Service, Inc. Relational Large Firm v. 
v. Passarella, 543 S.E.2d 113 (Ga. Ct. Individual 
App. 2000) 
Ga. Tattersall Club Corp. v. White, 501 Relational Large Firm v. 
S.E.2d 851 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) Individual 
Idaho Kohring v. Robertson, 44 P.3d 1149 Relational Individual v. 
(Idaho 2002) Closely-Held Firm 
Idaho General Auto Parts Co. v. Genuine Relational Large Firm v. Large 
Parts Co., 979 P.2d 1207 (Idaho Firm 
1999) 
Ill. Raskas Foods, Inc. v. Southwest Relational Large Firm v. Large 
Whey, Inc., 978 S.W.2d 46 (Mo. Ct. Firm 
App. 1998) 
196. Transactions are characterized as either relational or discrete indicating the 
extent to which the parties are (or were) in ongoing relationships rather than isolated or 
one-shot exchange transactions. 
197. Parties are coded as either individuals, closely-held firms (e.g., sole 
proprietorships, most partnerships, and closely-held corporations) or large firms (e.g., 
public corporations, limited partnerships, and professional partnerships). 
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TABLE 1 (CONT'D): 
ENFORCEABLE INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS 
Type of 
State Case Citation Transaction Parties 
Ind. McLinden v. Coco, 765 N.E.2d 606 Relational Closely-Held Firm v. 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2002) Closely-Held Firm 
Iowa Helm Financial Corp. v. Iowa Relational Large Firm v. Large 
Northern Railway, Co., 214 F. Supp. Firm 
2d 934 (N.D. Iowa 2002) 
Iowa Gallagher, Langlas & Gallagher v. Relational Large Firm v. 
Burco, 587 N.W.2d 615 (Iowa Ct. Individual 
App. 1998) 
Md. Giannaris v. Cheng, 219 F. Supp. 2d Relational Individual v. Individual 
687 (D. Md. 2002) 
Md. Lacy v. Arvin, 780 A.2d 1180 (Md. Ct. Relational Individual v. Individual 
Spec. App. 2001) 
Mass. Swartz v. Schering-Plough Corp., 53 F. Relational Individual v. Large 
Supp. 2d 95 (D. Mass. 1999) Firm 
Mo. American Laminates, Inc. v. J.S. Latta Relational Large Firm v. Large 
Co., 980 S.W.2d 12 (Mo. Ct. App. Firm 
1998) 
N.J. D & N Property Management & Relational Large Firm v. Large 
Development Corp. v. Copeland Cos., Firm 
127 F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
N.Y. Gonzalez v. Don King Productions, Relational Individual v. 
Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 313 (S.D.N.Y. Closely-Held Firm 
1998) 
N.Y. Non-Linear Trading Co. v. Braddis Relational Large Firm v. Large 
Associates, Inc., 675 N.Y.S.2d 5 (App. Firm 
Div. 1998) 
Ohio DeBoer Structures (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Relational Large Firm v. Large 
Shaffer Tent & Awning Co., 233 F. Firm 
Supp. 2d 934 (S.D. Ohio 2002) 
Ohio Nilavar v. Osborn, 738 N.E.2d 1271 Relational Individual v. Individual 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2000) 
Ohio Vargo v. Clark, 716 N.E.2d 238 (Ohio Relational Individual v. Individual 
Ct. App. 1998) 
Okla. McCurdy Group, L.L.C. v. American Relational Large Firm v. Large 
Biomedical Group, Inc., 9 Fed. Appx. Firm 
822 (10th Cir. 2001) 
Pa. ATACS Corp. v. Trans World Relational Large Firm v. Large 
Communications, Inc., 155 F.3d 659 Firm 
(3d Cir. 1998) 
Tenn. Davidson v. Holtzman, 47 S.W.3d 445 Relational Individual v. Individual 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) 
Tex. Herrmann Holdings Ltd. v. Lucent Relational Large Firm v. Large 
Technologies, Inc., 302 F.3d 552 (5th Firm 
Cir. 2002) 
Tex. Esquenazi v. Sardar, No. DV98-07269- Relational Large Firm v. 
E, 2002 WL 519684 (Tex. Ct. App. Individual 
Apr. 8, 2002) 
V.I. Morton v. Hewitt, 202 F. Supp. 2d Relational Individual v. Individual 
394 (D.V.I. 2002) 
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Services, Inc., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d Large Firm bonus contract 
383 (Ct. App. 1998) 
Conn. Suffield Development Associ- Discrete Large Firm v. Comfort 
ates v. Society for Savings, 708 Large Firm agreement 
A.2d 1361 (Conn. 1998) 
Conn. 111 Whitney Ave., Inc. v. Coin- Discrete Closely-Held Indefinite 
missioner of Mental Retarda- Firm v. Large bonus contract 
tion, 802 A.2d 117 (Conn. Firm 
App. Ct. 2002) 
Conn. Coady v. Martin, 784 A.2d 897 Discrete Individual v. Comfort 
(Conn. App. Ct. 2001) Individual agreement 
Colo. National Mortgage Corp. v. Relational Large Firm v. Deliberately 
Greenwich Capital Financial L.arge Firm incomplete 
Products, Inc., 53 Fed. Appx. (end-game) 
510 (10th Cir. 2002) 
Colo. DiFrancesco v. Particle Inter- Relational Closely-Held Agreement to 
connect Corp., 39 P.3d 1243 Firm v. Large agree (settle- (Colo. Ct. App. 2001) Firm ment) 
Fla. University Creek Associates II, Discrete Large Firm v. Comfort 
Ltd. v. Boston American Large Firm agreement 
Financial Group, Inc., 100 F. 
Supp. 2d 1337 (S.D. Fla. 1998) 
Fla. Bergman v. Delulio, 826 So. Discrete Individual v. Comfort 
2d 500 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Individual agreement 
2002) 
Ga. OfficeMax, Inc. v. Sapp, 132 F. Discrete Large Firm v. Letter of intent 
Supp. 2d 1079 (M.D. Ga. Closely-Held 
2001) Firm 
Ga. Zurich American Insurance Discrete Large Firm v. Inadvertence 
Co. v. General Car & Truck Large Firm 
Leasing System, Inc., 574 
S.E.2d 914 (Ga.. Ct. App. 
2002) 
Ga. Aukerman v. Witmer, 568 Relational Individual v. Deliberately 
S.E.2d 123 (Ga. Ct. App. Individual incomplete 
2002) 
Ga. Bulloch South, Inc. v. Gosai, Discrete Closely-Held Inadvertence 
550 S.E.2d 750 (Ga. Ctp.App. Firm v. Individ- 
2001) ual 
Ga. Burns v. Dees, 557 S.E.2d 32 Relational Individual v. Indefinite (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) Individual bonus contract 
. . .. .. . 
198. Cases are coded by state, type of transaction, and nature of parties as in table 1. 
In addition, the cases are coded by "Type of Agreement": inadvertently incomplete 
agreement, deliberately incomplete agreement, indefinite bonus agreement, general 
agreement to agree, comfort agreement, formal letter of intent, sales contract, and 
indefinite non-compete clause. 
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UNENFORCEABLE INDEFINITE AGREEMENTS 
Iii~iii ~ ~~iiiii • siiiil  f;~iiiii l~ ~ii~iiiiii l' Type of Type of 
State Case Citation Transaction Parties Agreenie t 
Ga. Mooney v. Mooney, 538 S.E.2d Discrete Individual v. Indefinite 
864 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) Individual bonus contract 
Ga. Faulkner v. Hood, 539 S.E.2d Discrete Individual v. Indefinite 
886 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) Individual bonus contract 
Ga. Gill v. B & R International, Relational Individual v. Indefinite 
Inc., 507 S.E.2d 477 (Ga. Ct. Large Firm bonus contract 
App. 1998) 
Ill. Brines v. XTRA Corp., 304 Relational Individual v. Deliberately 
F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2002) Large Firm incomplete 
Ill. Wilkes v. AccuStaff, Inc., 42 F. Relational Individual v. Indefinite 
Supp. 2d 842 (N.D. Ill. 1999) Large Firm bonus contract 
Ind. Mays v. Trump Indiana, Inc., Discrete Individual v. Agreement to 
255 F.3d 351 (7th Cir. 2001) Large Firm agree 
Ind. Don Webster Co. v. Indiana Relational Large Firm v. Indefinite 
Western Express, Inc., 161 F. Large Firm bonus contract 
Supp. 2d 959 (S.D. Ind. 2001) 
Iowa Schaller Telephone Co. v. Discrete Large Firm v. Agreement to 
Golden Sky Systems, Inc., 298 Large Firm agree 
F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 2002) 
Kan. Sprint Corp. v. DeAngelo, 12 Discrete Large Firm v. Indefinite non- 
F. Supp. 2d 1188 (D. Kan. Individual compete clause 
1998) 
Ky. Auto Channel, Inc. v. Speedvi- Discrete Closely-Held Agreement to 
sion Network, LLC, 144 F. Firm v. Large agree 
Supp. 2d 784 (W.D. Ky. 2001) Firm 
Me. Larson v. Johnson, 184 F. Relational Individual v. Indefinite 
Supp. 2d 26 (D. Me. 2002)199 Individual bonus contract 
Md. Doe v. Doe, 712 A.2d 132 Relational Individual v. Indefinite 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) Individual bonus contract 
Minn. Richie Co. v. Lyndon Insur- Relational Closely-Held Comfort 
ance Group, Inc., 316 F.3d Firm v. Closely- agreement 
758 (8th Cir. 2002) Held Firm 
Miss. Hunt v. Coker, 741 So. 2d Discrete Individual v. Comfort 
1011 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) Individual agreement 
Mo. Smith v. Hammons, 63 S.W.3d Discrete Individual v. Indefinite 
320 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) Individual bonus contract 
Neb. Cheloha v. Cheloha, 582 Discrete Individual v. Indefinite 
N.W.2d 291 (Neb. 1998) Individual bonus contract 
N.Y. Jalor Color Graphics, Inc. v. Relational Large Firm v. Indefinite 
Knoll Pharmaceutical Co., 26 Large Firm bonus contract 
Fed. Appx. 38 (2d Cir. 2001) 
199. Summary judgment for defendant was denied on the grounds that plaintiffs 
claim for wages at his earlier rate presented a jury question. 
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Type ofType of 
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N.Y. Wechsler v. Hunt Health Sys- Discrete Large Firm v. Deliberately 
tems, Ltd., 186 F. Supp. 2d Large Firm incomplete 
402 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
N.Y. Missigman v. USI Northeast, Relational Individual v. Agreement to 
Inc., 131 F. Supp. 2d 495 Large Firm agree 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
N.Y. Sugerman v. MCY Music Discrete Individual v. Indefinite 
World, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 2d Closely-Held bonus contract 
316 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) Firm 
N.Y. Gorodensky v. Mitsubishi Pulp Discrete Large Firm v. Letter of intent 
Sales (MC), Inc., 92 F. Supp. Large Firm 
2d 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
N.Y. Cleveland Wrecking Co. v. Discrete Closely-Held Agreement to 
Hercules Construction Corp., Firm v. Closely- agree 
23 F. Supp. 2d 287 (E.D.N.Y. Held Firm 
1998) 
N.Y. Lowinger v. Lowinger, 733 Relational Individual v. Indefinite 
N.Y.S.2d 33 (App. Div. 2001) Individual bonus contract 
N.Y. F & K Supply, Inc. v. Willow- Discrete Closely-Held Settlement 
brook Development Co., 732 Firm v. Closely- agreement 
N.Y.S.2d 734 (App. Div. 2001) Held Firm 
N.Y. Robert Plan Corp. v. Perot Sys- Discrete Closely-Held Deliberately 
tems Corp., 718 N.Y.S.2d 50 Firm v. Individ- incomplete 
(App. Div. 2000) ual 
N.Y. Strauss Paper Co. v. RSA Exec- Discrete Large Firm v. Inadvertence 
utive Search, Inc., 688 Large Firm 
N.Y.S.2d 641 (App. Div. 1999) 
N.C. Miller v. Rose, 532 S.E.2d 228 Discrete Individual v. Comfort 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2000) Individual agreement 
N.D. Stout v. Fisher Industries, Inc., Discrete Individual v. Comfort 
603 N.W.2d 52 (N.D. 1999) Closely-Held agreement 
Firm 
Ohio Ullmo ex rel. Ullmo v. Gil- Discrete Individual v Deliberately 
mour Academy, 273 F.3d 671 Closely-Held incomplete 
(6th Cir. 2001) Firm 
Ohio Kostelnik v. Helper, 770 Discrete Individual v. Inadvertence 
N.E.2d 58 (Ohio 2002) Individual 
Ohio Allied Erecting & Dismantling Discrete Closely-Held Indefinite 
Co. v. Uneco Realty Co., 765 Firm v. Closely- bonus contract 
N.E.2d 420 (Ohio Ct. App. Held Firm 
2001) 
Okla. Vice v. Conoco, Inc., 150 F.3d Relational Individual v. Indefinite 
1286 (10th Cir. 1998) Large Firm bonus contract 
Pa. Aircraft Guaranty Corp. v. Discrete Large Firm v. Sales contract 
Strato-Lift, Inc., 103 F. Supp. Large Firm 
2d 830 (E.D. Pa. 2000) 
S.D. Estate of Fisher v. Fisher, 645 Relational Individual v. Comfort 
N.W.2d 841 (S.D. 2002) Individual agreement 
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State' CsCtainTransaction Paties Agreement 
Tenn. Doe v. HCA Health Services of Discrete Individual v. Deliberately 
Tennessee, Inc., 46 S.W.3d Large Firm Incomplete 
191 (Tenn. 2001) 
Tex. In re United States Brass Discrete Individual v. Inadvertence 
Corp., 277 B.R. 326 (Bankr. Large Firm 
E.D. Tex. 2002) 
Tex. Fort Worth Independent Relational Large Firm v. Comfort 
School District v. City of Fort Large Firm agreement 
Worth, 22 S.W.3d 831 (Tex. 
2000) 
Tex. Oakrock Exploration Co. v. Discrete Closely-Held Agreement to 
Killam, 87 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. Firm v. Individ- agree 
Ct. App. 2002) ual 
Tex. John Wood Group USA, Inc. Discrete Large Firm v. Letter of intent 
v. ICO, Inc., 26 S.W.3d 12 Large Firm 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2000) 
Utah Homestead Golf Club, Inc. v. Discrete Large Firm v. Comfort 
Pride Stables, 224 F.3d 1195 Closely-Held agreement 
(10th Cir. 2000) Firm 
Va. Beazer Homes Corp. v. VMIF/ Discrete Closely-Held Letter of intent 
Anden Southbridge Venture, Firm v. Individ- 
235 F. Supp. 2d 485 (E.D. Va. ual 
2002) 
Wis. Chirichillo v. Prasser, 30 F. Discrete Individual v. Indefinite 
Supp.. 2d 1132 (E.D. Wis. Individual bonus contract 
1998) 
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